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I. INTRODUCTION
As the computer industry continues to impress us with the swift
evolution of its technologic production,1 lawmakers and courts
worldwide labor to keep pace. Since construction of the first
commercial electronic computer with a stored program in 1951,2
the computer industry, previously dominated by a few major
corporations, has proliferated and become significantly more
competitive.3 Just as introduction of the printing press4 once
precipitated an explosion of literary expression and broad
dissemination of literature throughout society,5 today's advances
in computer technology facilitate an ever-increasing current of
creative output, raising persistent questions of domestic and
international law.
1. The computer industry continues to experience significant yearly growth. By way of
example, total production of software and software-related services worldwide reached U.S. $65.6
billion in 1988. In 1989, total worldwide production reached U.S. $76.1 billion, representing a 16%
increase in growth. Between 1984 and 1994, the average annual growth in the world software
industry is estimated at 21%. See the statistics published by Electronics International Corporation in
1989 and 1990. En Dera Tte, 01 RAFREscEs, Mar. 1990, at 93; L'industrie InforinatiqueJaponaise
en Pleine Santi, LE MOND INFORMATIQUE, Nov. 19, 1990, at 63.
2. See Richard L Torezon, Copyright, Patent and the Virtual Machine, 9 COPYRIGHT L. J.
321, 321-53 (1989).
3. In spite of this increasing competitiveness, the domination of American companies in the
world's computer industry cannot be underestimated. According to a report recently published by
International Data Corporation, whereas French companies hold 8% of the world's $110 billion
market for software and software related services, American companies hold 57%. Among these
American companies, several hold disproportionately powerful positions. For instance, in 1990,
International Business Machines Corp. (IBM) commanded 19.6% of the software market in Western
Europe as compared to the 1.6% held by Bull, France's premier software producer. See Can the U.S.
Stay Ahead in Software, Bus. WK., Mar. 11, 1991, at 62-67; L'Europe du Progiciel, 01 RAtEscs,
Mar. 1990, at 78-83.
4. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417,430 (1984) ("Indeed, it was
the invention of a new form of copying equipment-the printing press-that gave rise to the original
need for copyright protection.").
5. There is an important historical link between innovations in technology and circulation
of ideas among society. As one commentator expressed, "The fortunes of the law of copyright have
always been closely connected with freedom of expression, on the one hand, and with technological
improvements in means of dissemination, on the other. Successive ages have drawn different balances
among the interest of the writer in the control and exploitation of his intellectual property, the related
interest of the publisher, and the competing interest of society in the untrammeled dissemination of
ideas." Id. at 431 n.12 (quoting BENJAMIN KAPLAN, Foreword to AN UNHuRRiED VIEW oP
CoPYRIGHT vii-viii (1967)).
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Although controversy regarding legal protection of computer
technologies continues, there is broad international consensus
among judges and legislators that, in general, copyright provisions
are appropriate.6 Courts in the United States have explicitly
classified computer programs as copyrightable literary works.7
Similarly, French tribunals have analogized computer programs to
literary works and specifically concluded that original software
constitutes a copyrightable oeuvre de l'esprit' While jurists? in
both systems have often criticized these classifications as being
misguided or even fictitious,"0 today they represent legal reality
6. Scholars and lawmakers primarily have debated whether copyright law or patent law
should be used as the principal form of legal protection for computer programs. In the United States,
although copyright remains the main form of protection, the courts also have allowed some patent
protection for computer programs. The American patent statute protects "any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof." 35
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Although this provision does not specifically include computer programs in
patent's subject matter, it also does not exclude them. Accordingly, in the 1981 case of Diamond v.
Diehr, 450 U.S. 174 (1981), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the patentability of a machine which
included a computer program as one of its component parts. Two years later, in Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curti, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del.
1983), the United States District Court for the District of Delaware concluded that a Securities
Brokerage-Cash Management System, comprised of several highly technical computer programs, was
patentable. By contrast, the French statute governing patents specifically excludes computer programs
from patentable subject matter. See French Law No. 68-1, art. 6 (1968), as modified by Law No. 78-
742 (1978). In the 1981 Schlumberger case, however, the Paris Court of Appeals (Courd'appel) held
that a process may not be deprived of patent protection solely because it includes one or more
procedures executed by a computer program. See B. PHaup, BREvES D'1NVENTON B7 (3d ed. 1989)
(citing Judgment of June 15, 198 1, Paris Cour d'appel, Propridt6 Industrielle-Bulletin Documentaire,
285 M 175).
7. See infra notes 96-102 and accompanying text.
8. The term *'oeuvre de I'esprit," which describes the general category of works protected
under France's law of artistic and literary property, does not have an exact equivalent in English. One
might translate it as "'work of authorship" or "'intellectual work." See infra notes 189-205 and
accompanying text.
9. The term "jurist" shall be used in this article to refer to persons "having a thorough
knowledge of law," including lawyers, legislators, and judges. WEsaM's NINTH NEw COLLEGIATE
DicTIoNARY 655 (1986).
10. See P. Gaudrat, La Protection des logiciels par le droit de la propriltd littdraire et
artistique, 128 REvuE INTERNATIONALE Du DROIT D'AuTEUR [R.I.D.A.] 76, 121 (1986) (Under
French law, software is not a copyrightable work of authorship although, relying on a legal fiction,
it can be classified as such); see also Pamela Samuelson, CONTU Revisited: The Case Against
Copyright Protectionfor Computer Programs in Machine Readable Form, 1984 DuKE L.J. 663, 741
("In machine-readable form, the utility of computer programs cannot be separated from their non-
utilitarian aspects, and for this reason... they ought to be deemed uncopyrightable."); Virginia R.
Lyons, Note, Carrying Copyright Too Far: The Inadequacy of the Current System of Protection for
Computer Programs, 12 HAsTINas Comm. & ENT. LJ. 81,93 (1989) ("The fundamental reason why
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not only in these nations, but in countries worldwide." In fact,
after entertaining broad transnational debate and considering several
draft proposals, the Council of Ministers of the European
Community [hereinafter Council] recently passed a directive calling
upon member states of the European Community (EC) to provide
protection to computer programs under uniform copyright
provisions.12  The Directive follows closely the case law of
American courts, classifying computer programs as literary
works,"3 stating a minimal originality requirement, 4 and setting
the basic period of protection at life of the author plus fifty years,
or at fifty years where a legal person is designated as the author
under national legislation. 5
While copyright protection for computer programs seems a
clear international mandate, the required scope of protection
remains, nonetheless, quite fuzzy. The chief uncertainty concerns
the creative activity the law purports to protect. In particular,
copyright protection is inappropriate for software is that computer programs are utilitarian tools,
rather than pure expression of information, like other copyrightable works.").
11. Copyright is the principal form of legal protection for computer programs in many
countries including, among others, Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, the
Netherlands, Japan, the United States, Canada, Mexico, and Chile. See M. VIvANT E AL, LAMY
DROIT DE L'INFORMATIQuE 621 (1991).
12. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs, 1989 O.J. (C 91) 4; Commission Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 1990 OJ. (C 320) 22; Council Directive Concerning the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs, 1991 OJ. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Directive]. Pursuant to article
10 of the Directive, EC member states must conform their laws with the Directive before January 1,
1993. Id.
13. Directive, supra note 12, art. 1. "In accordance with the provisions of this Directive,
Member States shall protect computer programs, by copyright, as literary works, within the meaning
of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. For the purposes of this
Directive, the term 'computer program' shall include their preparatory design material." Id (emphasis
added).
14. Id art. 1, 3. "A computer program shall be protected if it is original in the sense that
it is the author's own intellectual creation. No other criteria shall be applied to determine its
eligibility for protection." Id (emphasis added).
15. Id art. 8. "Protection shall be granted for the life of the author and for fifty years after
his death or after the death of the last surviving author;, where the computer program is an
anonymous or pseudonymous work, or where a legal person is designated as the author by national
legislation in accordance with Article 2(1), the term of protection shall befify years from the time
that the computer is frst lawfully made available to the public. The term of protection shall be
deemed to begin on the first of January of the year following the above mentioned events." Id.
(emphasis added).
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national laws remain imprecise about what aspects of a computer
engineer's work constitutes protectable expression. What portion of
a computer engineer's creative output can he call his own?
Moreover, national laws provide inconsistent guidance to the
engineer who, canvasing existing technologies, wonders which
elements he may incorporate into his creation and which, if
borrowed, would make him an infringer.
Software developers have long advised lawmakers that the
process of creating computer technologies is accretive: computer
engineers build progressively upon past works."6 As in any other
technology-based industry, computer engineers rely on the existing
art to develop their product. They study the existing repertory and
then make improvements. They seek solutions that will maximize
utility and conform to industry standards. Consumers desire highly
efficient, compatible wares, and developers set out to produce
them.
When undertaking to design a new software product,
developers, like most other creators, have conflicting interests.
Although developers seek freedom to study, imitate, and elaborate
upon technologies with proven industry performances, they also
seek to eliminate the threat of parasitic second comers. After
investing significant resources to mastermind a computer
innovation, developers desire guarantees that they will be able to
claim ownership and exclusive rights in their creation. 7 Striking
a balance between a developer's need for both access to existing
works and protection of his own creation is one of the primary
roles of intellectual property law. Ideally, the law should clearly
16. See, e.g., Dennis S. Karala, United States Adherence to the Berne Convention and
Copyright Protection of Information-Based Technologies, 28 JuRXmircs J. 147, 149 (1988)
("Advances in technology are usually made through incremental developments on an existing
base.").
17. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 7, 1986, Cass. ass. plan., 1986 Dalloz-Sirey [D.S.] 405-12
conclusions Cabannes (quoting the French Senate report on legal protection of computer software)
("The software industry ... often requires very heavy investments such that it is necessary to assure
the protection of those who invest to conceive, manufacture and sell new software products.")
("'industrie du logiciel. .. nicessite souvent de trds lourds investissements de sorte qu'il convient
de veiller d assurer la protection de ceux qui invextissent pour concevoir, fabriquer et vendre de
nouveaux logiciels.").
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inform developers regarding when they may appropriate existing
technologies without being punished, and when their own creative
contribution will be rewarded by a state's grant of exclusive rights.
The western world has decided that copyright law furnishes an
appropriate set of guiding rules. Although computer programs are
essentially utilitarian works, although the process of conceiving
them is vastly different from the work of literary and artistic
creation, and although the ultimate objectives of developers are
primarily commercial rather than art-minded, lawmakers have
generally voted for copyright protection. American and European
lawmakers have rejected the claim that laws previously applied to
artistic and literary works would be somehow denatured if applied
to computer technologies. They also have rejected the belief that
extending copyright protection would unduly limit the number of
successful market participants or thwart progress in the industry.
This article will describe and discuss French law on droit
d'auteur and American copyright law as presently applied to
computer programs and to expert systems,"8 focusing on
originality, the basic criterion of protection under both systems. In
particular, this article will examine whether the set of doctrinal
requirements, which courts refer to generally as "originality,"
provide clear and appropriate guideposts to instruct developers as
to which aspects of computer technologies may be protected. Do
these legal criteria properly inform developers about when they can
borrow from existing works and when they can obtain protection
for their own creations? Do they provide reliable tests enabling
courts to determine consistently whether particular works should be
copyrighted and what the scope of such protection should be? Are
these standards appropriate for assessing the copyrightability of the
full range of today's computer technologies?
After highlighting distinctions between traditional copyright and
droit d'auteur, this article will suggest that, in spite of these
historic differences, French and American courts today often adopt
18. Expert systems are knowledge-based computer programs which model human expert
perception to solve problems in a particular area of expertise. See infra notes 315-20 and
accompanying text.
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similar approaches to authors' rights. By comparing how courts in
France and the United States evaluate the originality of computer
technologies, this article will demonstrate that the stereotyped
characterization of droit d'auteur as primarily author-centered, and
copyright as obsessively business-minded, is no longer valid. Under
both American and French law, the originality of a computer
program is linked to the range of possible expression available to
the creator. American and French courts recognize original
expression where a developer has made independent creative
choices in designing his product.
Despite this increasing similarity in how they analyze
originality, both French and American courts still provide the
public with unclear messages about what originality, in fact, entails.
The language of French tribunals, for instance, seems to vacillate
between stating the concept of originality as an author-centered
principle, where protection is conditioned on the presence of
personal authorial expression, and as a labor-oriented principle,
where protection is linked, rather, to a demonstration of
independent intellectual effort. When dealing with computer
technologies, the courts in both systems seem unable to restrict
their inquiry to traditional terms of copyright. They often flirt with
notions such as novelty and obviousness, conventional locutions of
patent law. Finally, neither American courts nor French courts have
addressed the full set of technical and industry-related constraints
which may limit the range of programming expression.
The present article proposes that the courts attend to the unique
nature of computer technologies and develop clear guidelines by
which to assess the proper ambit of protection. Such guidelines
should enable courts systematically to separate a program's
nonoriginal elements-stemming from technical requirements,
conventions of computer programming, or industry-imposed
standards-from a program's original elements, those which flow
from a developer's unfettered creative thought. Courts may use
such guidelines to measure the originality not only of conventional
programs, but also of knowledge-based programs such as expert
systems. This article concludes that, if such guidelines are agreed
upon internationally, technological progress will be maximized
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since differences between the scope of protection will be reduced,
and computer developers will receive the information they need to
make appropriate decisions in their work and compete fairly in the
worldwide industry.
II. THE CoMPuTER: A BRIEF DESCRPTION OF THE MACHINE
The computer is a machine, and programs are necessary
mechanical components of any such machine. 9 While this
characterization of the computer may now seem obvious to many
jurists, others still appear to be mystified by the technology. The
computer's numerous components-such as algorithms, object code,
source code, software, hardware,2" firmware, and
compilers-though truly parts of a simple machine, strike them as
being different from the nuts and bolts of other machines.
Moreover, because computer engineers use programs, consisting of
symbolic language, to instruct computers how, when, and what to
do, jurists perceive a literary quality in the computer.2 In legal
systems which distinguish between patent protection for
technologic inventions and copyright protection for literary or
19. Exposition of a novel paradigm to explain the computer falls beyond the scope of the
present article. Instead, part If relies largely on the virtual machine model as described by Richard
L Torczon. See Torczon, supra note 2, at 343. Under this model, the computer is viewed as being
recursive and as having two basic elements, machine and language. Id. The machine component is
a detached object which performs operations according to the rules of its language. Language, under
this model, is nothing more than the set of rules obeyed by the machine. The recursion occurs when
a language, at one level of the machine, is translated into a second language. As Torezon explains,
"If the basic machine is M1 with language LI, and another language 12 is translated into LI to
make M1 perform some task, a new machine, M2 is created. M2 is defined by the rules of L2. Each
machine and language constitute a level .... This process can be repeated an infinite number of
times theoretically." Id. at 344. See generally Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp.
544, 549 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) ("Computers are machines .... ").
20. Hardware refers to the tangible machinery of the computer, including all the elaborate
electronic circuits which ultimately enable the computer to perform. The distinction traditionally made
between software and hardware is de-emphasized under the virtual machine paradigm since the
computer's hardware often includes components, such as programs, which would otherwise be
categorized.as software. Torczon, supra note 2, at 344.
21. See, e.g., Lucas, Propridti Litdraire et Arnisdque, JuRis CASSEuR Fasc. 303-1, at 4
(1989) (Where the author, without conceding that computer programs are truly literary works, states
that the decision to protect computer programs under French droit d'auteur stems from the fact that
they are "works of language").
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artistic works, jurists have most often classified computer programs
as copyrightable literary works and, until recently,22  rejected
patent protection for most aspects of these useful technologies.
No matter what the validity of comparing computer programs
to literary works, understanding the computer as a machine, of
which a program is an essential component, is crucial when
analyzing which aspects of computer programs are original and
thus protected by copyright.23 Because computer programs are
necessary to any computer's proper functioning, they will normally
contain some elements which, rather than embodying a
programmer's creative thought, reflect a standard programming
solution dictated by mechanical considerations or by other external
requirements. As the following sections of this article discuss, these
aspects cannot be considered "original" under either American or
French law.
In essence, the computer is a continuous chain of
communication, beginning with the human programmer and ending
with a useful function. This communicative chain is not driven by
human-like power or intuition; that is, the computer never actually
reads or interprets as would a truly literate entity. Rather, every
link in the chain is concatenated by electricity. As one source
states, "[A]ll work in a computer is a physical response to a series
of electrical pulses that the hardware interprets as off or on
22. Although copyright is still the principal form of legal protection afforded to developers
of computer software, the number of patents being granted for software technologies is fast
increasing. In the United States, large corporations file dozens of applications each year and already
hold far more computer-related patents than most smaller companies. According to one source, IBM
has received twice as many software patents to date as any other company worldwide. See Evan I.
Schwartz & Michele Galen, The Coming Showdown Over Software Patents, Bus. WK., May 13,
1991, at 63-64. For a compendium of comments submitted last year to the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office pertaining to patent protection for computer program-related inventions, see 14 COMPUTER
LAW. 809, 809-81 (1992).
23. The term "software" is often incorrectly used as a synonym for "program." See Steven
R. Englund, Idea, Process, or Protected Expression?: Determining the Scope of Copyright Protection
of the Structure of Computer Programs, 88 MICH. L REV. 866, 868 n.l1 (1990). In the present
article, "'software" (in English) or "logiciel" (in French) shall be viewed as an all-inclusive term
including "programs, procedures, rules, and any other associated documentation." l (citing
AMERICAN NATIONAL DICTIONARY POR INFORMATION PRocEssING SYSTEMs 367 (1984)). The
primary topic of discussion in this article will be legal protection of programs and of technologies,
such as expert systems, which incorporate them.
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signals." 2 4 Or, as another writer puts it, "Conceptually, the
'brains' of these machines are nothing more than the arrays of
elements, each capable of being in an 'on' or 'off' state, like a
lightbulb." 25 Notably, the pulses (or ons and offs) required to
make the computer perform can come from virtually any source,
including a program, hardware, or even a manual operator. 26 The
computer, thus, is simply a machine which, following
predetermined rules, operates through a continuity of unintelligent
electronic signals. Keeping in mind this macroscopic view of the
computer as an integral machine, one can next identify some of its
components in greater detail.
The chain of communication begins with computer
programming.27 A computer program is a set of instructions which
causes the computer to perform a mathematical function or
"algorithm.", 28 Programs can be written in either object code, a
binary language comprised of varying combinations of zeros and
ones, or in source code, an advanced or "high-level" language.29
Object code can be directly executed by the computer. Thus, by
programming the computer with complex series of zeros and ones,
the programmer can directly trigger the computer's ons and offs,
thereby inducing the machine to carry out a useful function.
However, most programmers use high-level languages when
drafting a program because the symbols such languages employ are
less difficult to work with. Since source code instructs the
computer only indirectly, however, such language must be
24. Torczon, supra note 2, at 323 n.8 (citing HENRI W. HANNEmAN, THE PATENrABUMnT op
COMPUTER SOFFWARE: AN INTERNATIoNAL GUmE TO THE PROTECnON OF COMPuTER-RATED
INVENTIONS 2 (1985) and TERRENcE W. PRATr, PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES: DESIGN &
IMPLEMENTATiON 19 (2d ed. 1984)).
25. LAwENcE CLAPES, SOmwARE, COPYRIGHT & COMPETImON: THE "LooK & FE'E OF
THE LAw 47 (1989).
26. Id. at 48.
27. Computer programming is "the designing, writing, and testing of programs." Englund,
supra note 23, at 869.
28. See Jack Sholkoff, Breaking the Mold: Forging a New and Comprehensive Standard of
Protection for Computer Software, 8 COMpuTER L. 389, 389-453 (1988).
29. In addition to being written in high-level languages such as FORTRAN, Pascal, COBOI,
or BASIC, source code can also be drafted in assembly languages comprised of alphabetic symbols
which programmers generally find easier to understand than the binary digits of object code.
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converted into object code to produce the ultimate "on" and "off"
signals that make the computer work.3" Computer programs can
be separated into two general categories: operating programs and
applications. Operating programs ("system software" as they are
sometimes dubbed) are programs which organize and operate the
internal functions of the computer, such as input and output." In
addition to permitting the computer to read other programs and
manage data, operating programs monitor and control any
application programs running on the computer.32 Application
programs are programs that process information in a specific way
or execute a particular function.33 It is a technological implement
or tool used to carry out a desired operation.3 4 Examples of
applications include games, financial spread sheets, word
processing, or even programs that facilitate musical composition.
The tangible components of the computer which actually carry
out the instructions provided by the programs might be broadly
termed "hardware." However, much hardware itself contains soft
(i.e., intangible or programmed) elements. A good example is the
central processing unit (CPU) where all of the apparatus enabling
the computer to process information is found. The CPU contains
not only internal memory where data may be stored for processing,
but also program instructions which interpret data received from
outside programs.35 Likewise, the computer's internal memory,
stored on chips, contains soft, preprogrammed data.36 Memory
chips in which a modem computer's permanent programming is
stored are aptly termed "firmware" (i.e., having both "soft" and
30. This conversion, from source code to object code, is performed by a program called a
"'compiler" (when the source code is drafted in a high-level language) or an "assembler" (when the
source code is in assembly language).
31. Sholkoff, supra note 28, at 395.
32. Id.
33. See Lyons, supra note 10, at 81-98.
34. Id.
35. HILARY F. PEARSON, COMPUTER CormrAcrs: AN INTERNATIONAL GUIDE TO
AOREE MEs & SOFrwARE PRoImc=os 8-10 (1984).
36. The most common type of memory chip is a ROM which refers to "read-only memory."
The data contained in a ROM is preprogrammed during the chip's manufacture and cannot later be
altered.
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"hard" qualities). 7 These examples of merger between the
computer's soft and hard elements again point to the reality of the
computer as an integral machine and demonstrate that programs,
whether embodied in software or hardware, are vital components
of every computer.
In sum, programs are among the basic, constitutive elements of
every computer. Computers are machines and programs are the sets
of instructions which tell the computer what to do. As machine
parts, programs often contain technologies developers find
necessary to meet technical requirements or standard industry
practice. In the following sections, this article proposes that such
technologies rarely constitute a developer's original expression and,
thus, generally should not be protected under the laws of either
France or the United States.
Ill. PROTECTING INNOVATIONS IN COMPUTER PROGRAMS:
A COMPARATIVE VIEW
A. The Evolution of Copyright and Droit d'Auteur Compared
Analyzing the issue of originality under the American and
French legal systems initially requires exploration of the basic
distinctions between copyright and droit d'auteur. Simple
etymological analysis of these two terms reveals the most
fundamental disparity. Essentially, copyright is a body of law
which grants a creator the right to decide, for a certain time, who
may copy, publish or sell his work.38 Droit d'auteur, by contrast,
is a more general term encompassing a broad set of authors'
37. In fact, one source refers to firmware as "software embedded in electronical devices (i.e.,
hardware)." Torezon, supra note 2, at 323 (citing ANDREw S. TANENBAUM, STRUCTURED COMPUTER
ORGANIZATION 11 (2d ed. 1984)).
38. See WrmSmR's NINTH NEw Cou. IATE DICTIONARY 289 (1986) (defining copyright as
"the exclusive right to reproduce, publish and sell the matter and form of a literary, musical, or
artistic work.").
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rights.39  Specifically, France's Law No. 57-2987 of March 11,
1957 (hereinafter Law of 1957), in addition to recognizing an
author's economic right (droit picuniaire) to determine who may
perform or reproduce his work, also attempts to protect the author's
so-called "moral rights" (droits moraux).4' These rights,
considered to fall within the general category of personality rights
(droits de la personnalite,41  include the author's rights of
paternity,42  of maintaining the integrity of his work,43  of
divulging his work to the public, and of withdrawing his work from
publication.44 Thus, while copyright law generally focuses on a
single set of financial interests, droit d'auteur addresses financial
and moral interests.45
This elementary difference between droit d'auteur and
copyright law derives, in part at least, from the distinct historic
evolutions of these two bodies of law.46 American copyright
39. See GERARD CORNU, VOCABULAIREJURmiQUE 82 (1987) (Where droitd'auteuris defined
as: (1) "rights of economic or moral nature to which literary and artistic works give rise" ("droits
de caractire patrimonial . .. ou moral ... auxquels donnent prise les oeuvres litiraires et
artistiques"), and as (2) 'expression used (often and incorrectly) to refer to authors' royalties"
("expression employie (souvent et d tort) pour disigner les redevances dlauteurs.")).
40. The moral right, under French law, is what legal scholar Eugene Pouillet once defined as
"the right of the writer and the artist to create, and to have his thought respected." ("le droit, pour
l'crivain et l'artiste de crier et defaire respecter sa pensie.") E. POUILLET, TRArit THitoRIQUE er
PRATIQUE DE LA PROPRtrt LITrrRAIRE ET ARTISTIQUE 256 (3d ed. 1908); see R. PLAISANT,
PRoPRItrA LrrrRAm Er" ARTISTIQUE 14 (1985).
41. Rights of the personality under French law may be compared to privacy law under
American law. Article 9, section 1 of France's Civil Code states the general principle: "'Everybody
has the right to the respect of his private life" ("Chacun a droit au respect de sa vie privie"). See
C. CoLoMBEr, PROPRit LrrrtRAr Er" ARTISTIQUE Er DRorrs VoisiNs 143 (3d ed. 1986).
42. The right of paternity is derived from article 6 of the Law of 1957 which states that an
author "benefits from a right to the respect of his name, his authorship, and his work" ("L'auteur
jouit du droit au respect de son noma, de sa qualiti, et de son oeuvre"). In particular, the right of
paternity requires that an author's work be published with his name on it (or without his name if the
author so requests) and with the title he selected for it. PLISANT, supra note 40, at 61.
43. Pursuant to article 6 of the Law of 1957, the right of integrity assures that no
modifications of any kind will be made in an author's work without the author's prior approval. d.
44. Article 19 of the Law of 1957 sets forth the right to divulge the work to the public, while
article 32 permits the author, even after having assigned the work, to repent or withdraw it. Id
45. See PLAisANT, supra note 40, at 14; see also infra note 67 and accompanying text
(addressing moral interests).
46. A detailed study of the histories of copyright law in France and the United States falls
beyond the scope of this article. Accordingly, Part III only highlights pertinent aspects, but does not
cover every important historical fact.
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doctrine has its legal basis in article I, section 8 of the U.S.
Constitution47 which-states, "The Congress shall have Power ..
. to promote the progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." American copyright
law, following this constitutional grant to Congress, has evolved in
linear fashion,48 from the first statute promulgated in 1790 to the
1909 statute and present 1976 Copyright Act.49 Congress drafted
each of these statutes in order to encourage society's intellectual
development by giving authors short-term monopolies over their
works.
The theory behind these statutes, specifically, is that by
conferring authors with a monopoly over their intellectual works,
people will be motivated to do creative work and thus enhance
society at large.50 Assuming that an author does not assign his or
her rights in a work, the Copyright Act confers upon the author, as
owner, exclusive rights to reproduce the copyrighted work, prepare
derivative works based on it, distribute copies of it, and perform or
display it."1 The monopoly is for limited duration, thus assuring
that the work to which it attaches will ultimately fall into the
public domain. Courts view the primary purpose of granting such
47. See Sholkoff, supra note 28, at 396.
48. The term "linear" is used here to refer to the law's continuous development, through a
process of accretion, wherein each successive statute evolved directly out of preceding legislation.
49. In particular, the 1790 statute protected maps, books, and charts. Congress amended it
twelve years later to cover prints and, in 1831, added musical compositions to the list of protected
works. In 1865, photographs were included and, in 1860, paintings, drawings, chromos, statuettes,
statuary works, and models of fine art. Congress redrafted the statute in 1909. Motion pictures were
provided protection five years later and, in 1971, Congress again revised the statute and indicated,
among other things, that computer programs would be protected subject matter. See CLAPES, supra
note 25, at 15.
50. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1953) ("The economic philosophy behind the
clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement
of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents
of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' Sacrificial days devoted to such creative
activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services rendered.").
51. 17 U.S.C. § 105 (1988). Note that, unlike French law, this statute fails to provide the
author the right to paternity (i.e., to have his name appear as he wishes on his work) or the right to
integrity (i.e., to prevent unconsented modifications of his work). See Deborah Ross, Comment, The
United States Joins the Berne Convention: New Obligationsfor Authors' Moral Rights?, 68 N.C. L
RLv. 363, 369-70 (1990).
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a monopoly not as a reward to the author, but as an inducement for
the author's creative production. In the phrase of one court, "[T]he
immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good. ' 52  Notably, this notion-that the fundamental goal of
copyright law is to benefit the public (and not the author)-is today
rarely set forth in French legal theory or jurisprudence.53
Under American law, then, copyright is primarily an economic
mechanism.5" Courts applying copyright law seek an equilibrium
between the needs of creators, who require incentives to be
innovative and productive, and the needs of people in society, who
benefit most when access to information, technology, and art is
unencumbered. When courts provide expansive copyright protection
and permit creators to maintain monopolies over their works for
long periods of time, competition and innovation are thwarted.55
This is because copyright holders can prohibit creators, whose
works evince only marginal differences of creativity over
previously copyrighted matter, from introducing their works into
the marketplace.56 By contrast, when courts excessively restrict
the scope and duration of copyright, the theory goes, they eliminate
52. 1 MELVJU. B. NIMMER & DAvID NIMMER, NiwMma ON CoPYRIoHT § 1.03[A], at 1-32
(1990) [hereinafter NmrMein] (quoting Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156
(1975)); see Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201,219 (1953) ("The copyright law ... makes reward to the
owner a secondary consideration. However, it is intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable
rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; to afford greater encouragement
to the production of literary (or artistic) works of lasting benefit to the world.").
53. However, at least one commentator challenges the supposition that French droit d'auteur
is solely an author-centered corpus of law. See Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of 7wo Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America, 147 R.I.D.A., Jan. 1991, at 124, 155-77
(Contemporary French legal theorists have failed to document properly the perception of courts,
legislators, and scholars during France's revolutionary period, that droit d'auteur was developed not
only to protect authors' rights, but also to serve the public interest through intellectual enrichment).
54. The expression "economic mechanism" is used broadly here to refer to the ways in which
the law affects the distribution of all of society's resources, including both material assets and
intangible goods, such as the intellectual value of reading a book or listening to a piece of music.
55. Sholkoff, supra note 28, at 397.
56. Id.
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incentives for ingenuity and production, thus reducing creative
output and harming society in general. 7
Accordingly, courts in America have used copyright law, from
its inception in 1790 to the present, to ascertain the point of
economic equilibrium58 at which creators will still remain
motivated to labor while society's intellectual enrichment continues
to be maximized. The paramount objective of the law, in
accordance with the Constitution's grant of power to Congress, has
been to strike this balance, and thus divide ownership and use of
intellectual property fairly between individuals and the public. 9
French droit d'auteur, like American copyright law, evolved
through a gradual piecing together of discrete legislation and
judicial precedents. The Law of 1957, in force today, aggregates
several laws originally passed as separate legislation and
incorporates protection of authors' economic and moral rights
under a single rubric.' Although publishers in France received
privileges from the king as early as the sixteenth century,6" the
true prototype of present-day droit d'auteur emerged following the
French Revolution. France's government passed two laws, in
57. Id.
58. See supra note 54.
59. By contrast, French courts today rarely explain the goals of droltd'auteurin this way; that
is, they rarely state that the ultimate objective of granting authors short-term monopolies is to further
collective economic interests. However, in a recent and controversial case under French competition
law, the Paris Court of Appeals applied a public benefit argument to uphold the right of a high
technology company to prevent a nonapproved distributor from selling the company's products. In
particular, the court held that the company's selective distribution network, notwithstanding
competition rules under articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, was permissible because it assured
consumers would receive higher quality services and thus "'contributed to the development of
economic progress." Judgment of March 5, 1987 (S.A.R.L. Lasci Informatique v. Apple Computer
Co.), La Semaine Juridique [J.C.P.] II, No. 14931 (emphasis added).
60. See generally R. Plaisant, Propriitd Littdraire etArtdstique, JuRys CLASSEuR CtVuL Fasc.
301, at 2-6 (1985). For a detailed historical analysis of French droit d'auteur, see PoUaLEr, supra
note 40, at 1-23.
61. These privileges did not vindicate authors* rights. Rather, they protected publishers from
competitors who, with reduced expenses, could print the same works at reduced cost. The French
government did not actually recognize an author's right to his work until 1761, when the King's
Council (Conseil du Rot) granted a privilege to the daughters of La Fontaine for publication of the
Fables. CoLOMBr, supra note 41, at 7.
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179162 and 1793,63 disposing of the privileges system and instead
setting forth specific rights of the author. According to one
commentator, these postrevolutionary laws engendered two
important legal concepts: (1) an exclusive property right in the
author arising out of the author's intellectual creation, and (2) the
notion that the author's exclusive right is of temporary duration
since, ultimately, his work must fall into the public domain.'
The laws of 1791 and 1793 remained in force, subject only to
minor modifications, until the promulgation of the Law of 1957
which today, as amended under Law No. 85-660 of July 3, 1985
[hereinafter Law of 1985], governs issues of literary and artistic
property. 65 The Law of 1957 integrated provisions of the 1791 and
1793 laws with provisions from other legislation introduced in the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries." More important, the Law of
1957 set forth the central notion that an author holds an intangible
property right in his work which includes two salient aspects, one
patrimonial (i.e., economic) and the other moral. Article 1,
paragraph 1 of the Law of 1957 states:
The author of an intellectual work obtains an exclusive
incorporeal property right upon this work, valid against all
62. The Decree of January 13-19, 1791 conferred performance rights upon playwrights and
extended such rights to the playwright's heirs or assignees for five years following the playwright's
death. Id. at 7.
63. The Decree of July 19-24, 1793 established the right of reproduction and instituted an
exclusive right for writers, composers, painters, and designers to "sell, have sold, [or] distribute their
works in the territory of the Republic and to assign [such] property in whole or in part" ("vendre,
faire vendre, distribuer leurs ouvrages dans le territoire de la RNpublique et d'en cder la propridid
en tout ou en partie."). See Pouau.nr, supra note 40, at 23-24.
64. COLOMBET, supra note 41, at 8. See Ginsburg, supra note 53, at 155-77 (The 1793 law
assured, not only that authors would receive exclusive rights in their works, but also that such rights
would be granted solely to the extent they promoted the public interest).
65. The Law of 1957 was heralded as legislation which would take into account modem
means of publishing and broadcasting literary and artistic works as well as an ever-expanding range
of works begging legal protection. See COLOMBer, supra note 41, at 10-13.
66. This additional legislation included: (1) the Law of July 14, 1866 instituting the right of
an author's spouse to inherit the author's rights in his work and extending the period of rights to 50
years following the author's demise, (2) the Law of March 11, 1902 stating the principle that a work
may be protected no matter what its merit and intended purpose may be, (3) the Law of April 9, 1910
stating that an author who assigns his work still retains the right of reproduction, (4) the Law of May
20, 1920 introducing the drolt de suite, and (5) the Law of May 29, 1925 positing the notion that a
work is protected by the simple fact of its creation. COLOMBEr, supra note 41, at 8-10.
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third parties, by the sole fact of having created the work.
This right includes intellectual and moral attributes, as well
as an economic attribute, which are governed by the present
law.67
Under this two-layered scheme, the author acquires a set of freely
alienable economic rights. In particular, the author holds the
exclusive right to exploit his work under any form,68 including the
rights of performance and of reproduction.69 The author also
obtains a set of moral rights under the law. 70 Perpetual,
inalienable, and irrevocable, these rights remain with the author
notwithstanding his decision to sell or assign economic rights in his
work.7' An author's moral rights are of practical significance
because, being inalienable, they can always be raised as an ultimate
defense against misappropriation or misuse of the author's work.72
Moreover, these rights are important, from a theoretic perspective,
because they vindicate the belief that the law should protect an
author's work not only as an economic commodity, but as a
creation stemming from that author's personality, expressing his
unique ideas and sentiment." One commentator posits that, for
purposes of protection under droit d'auteur, the work is the
author.74
This author-centered view, conceptualizing the protected work
as an extension of the author's personality (or maybe even of his
person), has had something of a dormant presence in American
67. Law of 1957, art. 1, 1 ("L'auteurd'une oeuvre de lespritjouitsurcette oeuvre, duseul
fait de sa crdation, d'un droit de proprietd incorporelle exclusif er opposable d tous. Ce droit
comporte des attributs d'ordre intellectuel et moral alnsi que des ahtributs d ordre patrimoniaL qui
sont dMterminds par la prdsente loi.").
68. See Law of 1957, art. 21.
69. See Law of 1957, arts. 26-28.
70. The moral rights codified in the Law of 1957 derive from judicial law dating from the late
nineteenth century. See PouxlLm, supra note 40, at 256-59; H. DESBOIS, LE DRorr D'AuTEuR EN
FRANCE 264-65 (3d ed. 1978).
71. See Law of 1957, art. 6.
72. PLAISANT, supra note 40, at 58.
73. Id.
74. See Edelan, Drolts d'auteur et droirvoisins, Commentalre de la loin* 85-660 dujuillet
1985, 1987-L DALLOZ; see also Edelman, Craion et Banalitd, 1983 DALLOz ch. XIII, at 73-77.
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copyright jurisprudence.75 Perhaps the most vigorous judicial
espousal of a personalist theory of authors' rights is found in a
1903 Supreme Court case in which Justice Holmes proposed that:
[The work] is the personal reaction of an individual upon
nature. Personality always contains something unique. It
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very
modest grade of art has in it something irreducible, which
is one man's alone. That something he may copyright
unless there is a restriction in the words of the act.76
While Holmes's vision has received due attention from theorists, 77
American jurists have not further legitimated it through specific
federal legislation or a recurrent judicial expression of rights of the
personality. The United States Congress, although it recently passed
the Berne Convention Implementation Act providing U.S.
adherence to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary
and Artistic Works,7' has explicitly refused to recognize the moral
rights required under article 6bis of the Berne Convention.79
Congress determined that existing laws, such as the Lanham Act
and state unfair competition laws, provide similar protection."0
Scholars both in America and Europe'1 appear skeptical about the
75. American copyright theory, as described above, focuses more on whether, by granting an
author a copyright, certain collective economic benefits will ultimately inure to society rather than
on whether the author's particular manifestation of his personality will be safeguarded properly.
76. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249-50 (1903).
77. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of Works
ofInformation, 90 COLUM. L Rnv. 1865, 1937 (1990) ("Since Holmes, the personality justification
for copyright has enjoyed increasing vogue, to the detriment of the commercial value rationale.").
78. The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853
(1988).
79. Id. art. 6bis ("Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer
of said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to object to any
distortion, mutilation, or other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said
work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.").
80. See Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protection
of the Moral Rights ofAuthors, 22 INTE.L PRop. L. R .547 (1990), reprinted from 23 GA. L. REV.
1 (1988) (citing Final Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on U.S. Adherence to the Berne
Convention, 10 CoLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 1, 35 (1986)).
81. Id.; see Edelman, Entre copyright et droit d'auteur: l'intdgritd de l'oeuvre de l'esprit,
1990 D.S. ch. 295. Edelman argues that American law is not truly concerned with whether the
personality of one author has been deformed by a subsequent author's derivative work, but instead
with the economic issues of whether the first author's reputation has been injured or the value of his
work undermined.
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degree to which these provisions vindicate rights of the personality.
Also, the terms American courts generally use to describe keystone
copyright concepts, such as originality and original expression, are
conspicuously devoid of references to the personality concept.
French tribunals, by contrast, protect authors' moral rights broadly
and systematically, and specifically link originality to the
personality concept.
Yet, American copyright and French droit d'auteur appear to
be slowly growing closer together. America's jurisprudence boasts
some precedent which, coupled with passage of the Berne
Convention Implementation Act, compel revival of a personalist
approach to complement the economic bent of the present
copyright doctrines. National legislation specifically protecting
authors' moral rights may be on the horizon. 2 Meanwhile, French
jurists are trimming away many of the traditional moral rights in
cases involving technological works of limited authorial
personality. Under the Law of 1985, for instance, France's
legislature specifically withdrew certain moral rights from authors
of computer software, presumably to prevent software authors from
using a moral rights theory to challenge subsequent modifications
in their programs by end users.3 Likewise, France's lower courts
are increasingly adopting a narrow, economic outlook on authors'
rights, capturing much of the pragmatic spirit of American
copyright provisions.
This emerging confluence of French droit d'auteur and
American copyright law may be perceived as an important symbol
of international harmonization. As nations such as France and the
United States eliminate differences between their laws, barriers to
trade dissolve and economic productivity is ultimately maximized.
Compelling as the need for such harmonization may be however,
82. On December 1, 1990, Congress took a small step in this direction by passing the Visual
Artists Rights Act, Pub. L No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990), an amendment of the Copyright Act
of 1976 which provides limited protection of an artist's paternity and integrity rights in paintings,
designs, engravings, and sculptures. See Jane C. Ginsburg, Les Nouvelles Lois des Erats-Unis sur le
Droit Moral des Artistes d'Art Plastique, sur la Protection des Oeuvres d'Archictecture et sur la
Location des Logiciels, 147 R.I.D.A. 363, 363-65 (1991).
83. See infra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
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there is always the risk that abrupt changes may deform
fundamental concepts of national law, breaking with legal tradition.
B. Finding Originality in Computer Programs Under American
Law
1. Computer Programs as Works of Authorship Under the
Copyright Act of 1976
The Copyright Act of 1976 states that copyright protection
extends to "original works of authorship fixed in any tangible
medium of expression."" This terse phrase includes three legal
requirements, 5 two of which are essential to the present
discussion: to be protected, a work must be both original and a
work of authorship.8 6 A work of authorship is construed broadly
as referring to "such writings as are the result of intellectual
labor. ' 17 Although the statute sets forth a list of works of
authorship, the statute was intended to be illustrative and not
limitative.88 Thus, courts have deemed a cable wire code book,
maps, and even the layout of court decisions in a legal reporter to
be works of authorship within the statute's meaning."
Congress has never specifically included computer programs in
its catalogue of works of authorship. However, in 1980, only
twelve years after the U.S. Copyright Office accepted its first
84. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988) (listing seven categories of works of authorship including,
literary works and audiovisual works).
85. The third requirement-that the work be "Tixed in a tangible medium"-is not important
to the present discussion.
86. As one court stated, "This language isolates two watermarks of a copyrightable work: it
must be "original-i.e., a work of independent creation-and it must be a 'work of authorshp'-i.e.,
the fruit of artistic expression and intellectual labor." Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 693 F. Supp.
1204, 1205 (D.D.C. 1988), revd on other grounds, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
87. Higgens v. Keuffel, 140 U.S. 428, 431, (1891).
88. See Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Inti, 740 F. Supp. 37,48 (D. Mass. 1990)
(citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5664).
89. Reiss v. Nat'l Quotation Bureau, 276 F. 717 (C.D.N.Y. 1921) (code book); C.S. Hammond
& Co. v. Int'l College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206 (C.D.N.Y. 1962) (map); West Pub. Co. v. Mead
Data Cent. Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986) (layout of court decisions), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1070 (1987).
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copyright registration for a computer program, 90 Congress
amended the statute to include computer programs as copyrightable
subject matter.91  The Copyright Act of 1976, somewhat
ambiguously, had stated that computer programs would not receive
any more protection than they had received under the 1909
copyright statute.92 Following recommendations made by the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted
Works (CONTU), 93 Congress, in 1980, introduced three provisions
concerning protection of computer programs: (1) a definition of
"computer program," 94 (2) a provision stating that the owner of
a copy of a copyrighted program could use the program in a
computer or make an archival copy without risking infringement,
and (3) an amendment deleting the provision in the 1976 Act
which had limited protection to that furnished under prior law.95
Thus, although Congress provided developers with a rubric under
which protection of computer programs might be obtained, it chose
not to state directly that computer programs constitute works of
authorship under the statute.96
Courts in America, nonetheless, have explicitly categorized
computer programs as works of authorship or, more specifically, as
literary works.97 Rather than positing an elaborate analogy
between computer programs, which are drafted in symbolic code
90. See Keplinger, Computer Software-Its Nature and Protection, 30 EMORY .J. 483, 494
(1981).
91. Id.
92. CLAPEs, supra note 25, at 15.
93. CONTU was established by Congress in 1974 "to study and compile data ... concerning
... the reproduction and use of copyrighted works of authorship... in ... automatic systems
capable of storing, processing, retrieving, and transferring information .... - Final Report of the
National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works 4 (1978) [hereinafter
CONTU Report].
94. Computer program is defined as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly
or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
95. Keplinger, supra note 90, at 499-501.
96. But see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667 ("The term 'literary works' ... includes ... computer programs"), cited
in Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 49 (1990).
97. See, e.g., Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 445,
450-51 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (citing Whelan Associates v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222, 1234
(3d Cir. 1986)) ("It is now well-established ... that a computer program is a 'work of authorship.*
Under the Act, computer programs are classified as 'literary works' ").
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and then read by a machine, and other literary works (such as
poems or novels), which are perceived directly by human
beings, 98 many courts have identified programs as literary works
by simple reference to the statutory definition of that term:99 "
'Literary works' are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed
in words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia,
regardless of the nature of the material objects such as books,
periodicals, manuscripts, phonorecords, film, tapes, disks, or cards,
in which they are embodied." 1°° This definition is broad and thus
easily encompasses computer programs written in symbols and
embodied in various mediums, such as software, firmware, or
hardware. Of course, the ease with which programs may be
categorized as literary works under this statutory language does not
transform programs into veritable literary works. As one
commentator recently stressed, even if computer programs look like
literary works in their outward form, they are conceived and
ultimately used as technology, not as literary works or
literature."0 But the majority of American courts appear to look
beyond this line of argument, analogizing computer programs to
conventional literary works."° Accordingly, the analysis courts
now use to determine the copyrightability of a particular computer
technology generally focuses less on whether it should be classified
98. This distinction-between the human audience which enjoys true literary works and the
electronic circuits which respond to a program's machine code-was eloquently described by
Commissioner Hersey, a dissenting participant in the CONTU hearings: "Congress should weigh
most carefully the heavy responsibility of breaking with tradition and enabling, by law of the land,
for the first time ever, copyriiht protection for communication, not with fellow human beings, but
with machines-thus equating machines with human beings as intended recipients of the distribution
that copyright was intended to foster." CONTU Report, supra note 93, at 37.
99. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp., 740 F. Supp. at 49.
100. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
101. See Dennis S. Karala, Copyright, Computer Software and the New Protectionism, 28
JURIMEnCs J. 33, 41 (1988) ("Programs resemble literary works only in form; in the substance of
their creation and use they are technology-the technology for using computers.").
102. See, e.g., Whelan Assocociates v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d at 1234 ("Title 17
U.S.C. §102(a)(1) extends copyright protection to 'literary work,* and computer programs are
classified as literary works for the purposes of copyright.") (emphasis added); Apple Computer, Inc.
v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 (3rd Cir. 1983) ("mhe category of 'literary
works' .. . is not confined to literature in the nature of Hemingway's For Whom the Bell Tolls...
. Thus, a computer program, whether in object or source code, is a 'literary work'....") (emphasis
added).
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as a work of authorship than on whether it embodies original
expression.
2. The Originality and Creativity Requirements
Originality, as one court recently stated, is the "sine qua non
of copyrightability."' 3 Nimmer calls it "the one pervading
element prerequisite to copyright protection regardless of the form
of the work."'"'° Under American case law,1 5 a work is
generally deemed original if it was created independently and was
not copied.0 6 This narrow conception of originality follows
directly from the economic bias of American copyright law,
viewing the grant of a limited monopoly as the most efficient way
to spur authorial production. Specifically, it derives from the
Constitution's language granting "Authors... the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings., 10 7 An "author," the Supreme Court
once stated, is one "to whom anything owes its origin; originator;
maker; one who completes a work of science or literature." '
"Original," the U.S. Supreme Court has therefore deduced,
"means that the particular work owes its origin to the author."1 9
American courts carefully distinguish originality, a cardinal
requirement of copyright, from novelty, the essential criterion for
patent protection. In Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts,"0
103. Kamar Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981)..
104. NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01[A], at 2-6.
105. There is no statutory definition of "original" or "originality."
106. See L Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486,490 (2d Cir. 1976) (citing Alfred Bell
& Co. v. atalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951)) ("Originality means that the work
owes its creation to the author and this in turn means that the work must not consist of actual
copying....'); see also Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1455 (N.D.
Cal. 1991) ("Mhe originality requirement is simply a prohibition of actual copying by the copyright
holder."); Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 1010 (ND.
Tex. 1976) (citing Puddu v. Buonamici Statuary, Inc., 450 F.2d 401 (2d Cir. 1971) ("[O]riginality
has been considered to mean only that the work owes its origin to the author, i.e., is independently
created and not copied from other works.").
107. See Miller v. Universal City Studios, 650 F.2d 1365, 1368 (5th Cir. 1981).
108. Ia (citing Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884)).
109. See Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, 191 F.2d 99, 102 (2d Cir. 1951) (citing
Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57-58 (1884)).
110. 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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the hallmark case on originality, the court differentiated the two
concepts by comparing the terms "author" and "inventor." The
court stated: "The latter carries an implication which excludes the
results of only ordinary skill, while nothing of this is necessarily
involved in the former."... If authors were required to
demonstrate more than ordinary skill to obtain copyright, the court
explained, courts would be placed in the inappropriate position of
having to assess the literary or artistic merit of works.'
Accordingly, the court rejected the proposition that a work must be
"strikingly unique or novel" to secure copyright protection and
concluded:
All that is needed to satisfy both the Constitution and the
statute is that the 'author' contributed something more than
a 'merely trivial' variation, something recognizably his
own. Originality in this context means little more than a
prohibition of actual copying. No matter how poor
artistically the 'author's' addition, it is enough if it be his
own.
1 13
Under this formulation, the work need not be new, demonstrate
ingenuity, or represent an important advance over ideas expressed
in the existing repertoire. It must simply have had its origin with
the author. The threshold legal requirement of originality, then, is
a bar against copying rather than a specific measure of an author's
creativity or innovation. However, the supposition that original
under American law simply means "independently created" or
"not copied" is somewhat misleading in the. context of
comparative legal analysis. American courts, it is true, generally
employ the term in this narrow sense when referring to the initial
inquiry of copyrightability, that is, the threshold determination of
whether a work is a servile copy. Yet the courts have developed
additional doctrines to evaluate the magnitude of an author's
personal contribution, including the creativity requirement and the
111. Id. at 102.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 102-03 (footnotes omitted); see Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today
Publishing Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509,513 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[O]riginality is not synonymous with
novelty .... ").
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idea versus expression dichotomy. Although neither American
courts nor scholars formally dub them as such, these are truly
doctrines of originality.'14 They belong to what might be termed
the issue of originality, a broad assessment of the authorial
expression contained in a work; as contrasted with the legal
requirement of originality, the narrow question of whether a work
is a slavish copy.
Creativity, therefore, is another doctrine under which courts
probe the issue of originality."1 5 The creativity requirement goes
beyond the threshold question of whether a work demonstrates
independent effort, calling for an additional albeit marginal
quantum of authorial exertion."1 6 As the Seventh Circuit stated in
Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players
Association: "A work is original if it is the independent creation
of its author. A work is creative if it embodies some modest
amount of intellectual labor .... .""' Or, as another court
recently advised, "There is a narrow class of cases where even
admittedly independent efforts may be deemed too trivial or
114. In much of the existing legal literature, these doctrines are not discussed as being part of
the originality inquiry. Instead, they are considered separately, as determinants of so-called
"copyrightability" or the "scope of copyright." Although this classification may be appropriate in
a separate discussion of American copyright law, it would likely lead to inaccurate conclusions in
the present comparison of the French and American legal systems. In particular, while French courts
discuss aspects of what American jurists call "'copyrightability" under the originality rubric,
American courts discuss aspects of what the French call "originality" under "copyrightability."
Thus, superficial comparison between the French explanation of originality as the imprint of an
author's personality, and the American independent creation standard, for instance, would lead to the
exaggerated proposition that American courts require almost no authorial expression whereas French
courts require substantial authorial expression. To avoid this kind of distortion, the present article
posits a distinction, in American law, between the narrow legal requirement of originality and the
broader issue of originality.
115. See Baltimore Orioles, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 805 F.2d 663, 668
(7th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 480 U.S. 941 (1987) ("[O]riginality actually subsumes two separate
conditions.., the work must possess an independent origin and a minimum amount of creativity.");
cf. NM5ME, supra note 52, § 2.01[B], at 2-14 ("It is of only semantic significance whether
originality is defined as embodying such creativity or whether such creativity is regarded as a
necessary adjunct to originality.").
116. NMMER, supra note 52, § 2.01[B], at 2-14 ("Tlhere is invoked at least a minimal
requirement of creativity over and above the requirement of independent effort.").
117. 805 F.2d at 668 n.6.
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insignificant to support copyright." ' Thus, even an author who
has not copied his work will be unable to secure its copyright if he
cannot also demonstrate that he invested a sufficient degree of
creative effort in its conception. 9
Until recently, however, many courts seemed to interpret the
creativity criterion as requiring little more than an author's
independent intellectual effort. In Baltimore Orioles, Inc., for
instance, the Seventh Circuit suggested that creativity refers to an
author's exercise of brainpower rather than his use of artistic or
literary imagination. The relevant issue in Baltimore Orioles, Inc.,
was whether telecasts of baseball games could satisfy the legal
requirement of originality.120 Because the telecasts in question
were not reproduced, the court found it clear they were independent
creations and therefore original.121 As for the creativity of the
broadcasts, the court looked to the thought involved in producing
them: "The many decisions that must be made during the
broadcast of a baseball game concerning camera angles, types of
shots, the use of instant replays and split screens, and shot
selection... supply the creativity required ... .,,2 The
aesthetic merit of a work, the court insisted, is irrelevant to the
creativity inquiry123 which, instead, is simply a measure of an
author's intellectual travails.
118. Magic Mktg., Inc. v. Mailing Serv. of Pittsburgh, Inc., 634 F. Supp. 769, 771-72 (W.D.
Pa. 1986) (Envelopes marked with short phrases such as "telegram" or "priority message" lacked
requisite creativity).
119. See, e.g., Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878,882 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("To constitute
a 'work of authorship,' the [work] ... must pass a 'creativity' threshold, i.e., it must embody 'some
modest amount of intellectual labor."'); John Muller & Co., Inc. v. N.Y. Arrows Soccer Team, 802
F.2d 989, 990 (8th Cir. 1986) (Logo comprised of four lines forming arrow and the word "arrow"
written in cursive script displayed insufficient "creative authorship"); L Batlin & Son, Inc. v.
Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denie4 429 U.S. 857 (1976) (Plastic Uncle Sam
banks copied from cast iron version in public domain did not demonstrate sufficient intellectual effort
to satisfy creativity standard).
120. The case itself arose out of a lasting dispute between the Major League Baseball Clubs
and the Major League Baseball Players Association concerning ownership of the broadcast rights to
the games. 805 F.2d at 665-68.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The court stated: "Only a modicum of creativity is required for a work to be copyrightable
... aesthetic merit is not necessary .... - Id. at 669.
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In fact, the best gauge of creativity, the court proposed, is
whether an author's work has won commercial success in the
public:
'[IIf . . . [certain works] command the interest of any
public, they have a commercial value-it would be bold to
say that they have not an aesthetic and educational
value-and the taste of any public is not to be treated with
contempt' . . . . That the [baseball player's] performances
possess great commercial value indicates that the works
embody the modicum of creativity required for
copyrightability' 24
Consistent with the economic justification of American copyright,
the Seventh Circuit treats the business value of baseball broadcasts
as an appropriate calculus of their creativity. Likening a work's
creativity to its marketability, the court's equation could not seem
farther from the author-centered vision of French law which
conditions protection on an author's display of personality in his
oeuvre.
Yet, in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Co., 125 the United States Supreme Court recently gave new bite
to the creativity requirement.'26 The main issue the Court
reviewed was whether Rural's directory, a compilation of names,
addresses, and phone numbers, was copyrightable. Rejecting
Rural's argument that its effort in compiling the information met
124. kd (quoting Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903)).
125. 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
126. The facts of the case, in brief, were as follows. A certified public utility with a monopoly
franchise on telephone services in one area of Kansas, respondent Rural Telephone Service Company
[hereinafter Rural] was required by regulation to publish an annual telephone directory. Feist
Publications, Inc. [hereinafter Feist], a private company, published special telephone directories
covering wide geographical areas. To obtain its white pages listings, Feist offered to pay various
phone companies in Kansas for the right to use their listings. Of 11 companies Feist approached, only
Rural refused to license its information. Unable to obtain the information in any other practicable
way, Feist copied Rural's white pages listings without Rural's consent. Rural sued for copyright
infringement in the District Court for the District of Kansas. The district court granted summary
judgment to Rural, upholding the copyrightability of telephone directories. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit confirmed. Id. at 1286-87.
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the threshold requirements of copyrightability,127 the Supreme
Court determined that, to be original under the Copyright Act of
1976, a compilation must also embody true authorial creativity. In
the court's phrase, "copyright rewards originality, not effort." '
"Original," the Court first specified, means that "the work was
independently created by the author... and that it possesses at
least some minimal degree of creativity.' ' 19 Based on the
statutory definition of "compilation," the Court determined that the
creativity necessary to render a compilation "original" depends on
the way an author selects, coordinates and arranges the facts
contained in his compilation.13 "Compilation" is defined under
section 101 of the 1976 Act as "a work formed by the collection
and assembly of preexisting materials or of data that are selected,
coordinated, or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as
a whole constitutes an original work of authorship., 131
Accordingly, the Court concluded that some compilers, even if they
work independently, might not select, coordinate and arrange facts
in such a way-i.e., in a sufficiently original way-to justify
copyright protection. 132 "There remains a narrow category of
works," the Court stated, "in which the creative spark is utterly
lacking or so trivial as to be virtually non-existent. 13 3
Based on the facts presented, the court determined that Rural
had not imbued its directory with the modicum of creativity
required. The phone company, the Court said, "expended sufficient
127. Rural's argument was based primarily on the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious
collection" theory under which courts justify granting copyright to compilations based solely on the
work involved in preparing them. Id. at 1291 (citing Jewler's Circular Publishing Co. v. Keystone
Publishing Co., 281 F. 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1922)).
128. Id. at 1297.
129. Id. at 1287.
130. 111 S. Ct. at 1293-94.
131. Id. at 1293 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
132. Id. at 1294.
133. Id.
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effort to make the white pages directory useful, but insufficient
creativity to make it original."' 34 The Court explained:
This arrangement may, technically speaking, owe its origin
to [the telephone company] . ... But there is nothing
remotely creative about arranging names alphabetically in
a white pages directory. It is an age-old practice, firmly
rooted in tradition and so commonplace that it has come to
be expected as a matter of course . .. It is not only
unoriginal, it is practically inevitable. This time-honored
tradition does not possess the minimal creative spark
required by the Copyright Act and the Constitution.'35
By refusing to recognize originality based solely on labor invested
in preparing a work and by conditioning copyright on an additional
measure of authorial presence, the Supreme Court heightened the
creativity component of the originality test.
To date, few copyright cases concerning computer technologies
have emphasized the creativity requirement.136 However, in future
cases regarding computer technologies and other information-based
works, the federal courts, following Feist Publications, Inc., are
likely specifically to examine not only whether a particular author
has brought the work into existence, but whether he has infused his
work with the requisite kernel of creativity.
3. The Idea Versus Expression Dichotomy
Even after deciding a work has satisfied the bottom-line
originality and creativity requirements, American courts, pursuant
to the so-called "idea versus expression dichotomy," continue to
probe the issue of originality, that is, whether the author has put
134. Id. at 1296.
135. Id. at 1297.
136. But see Allen-Myland, Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) ("Mhe requisite level of creativity is extremely low.., the vast majority of works make
the grade quite easily .... "); cf Atari Games Corp. v. Oman, 888 F.2d 878 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(holding that Copyright Office did not properly explain its application of the creativity requirement
to refuse protection to a computer-generated video game).
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sufficient imagination into his work to justify copyright.'37
Section 102(b) of the Copyright Act codifies the rule, stating that:
"In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle or discovery, regardless of the form
in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such
work."13 Based on this provision, courts have concluded that
copyright protects only the expression of ideas, not the ideas
themselves. 39 By restricting copyright to specific, individualized,
imaginative creations called "expression," and refusing protection
for more general, standard, or banal concepts dubbed "ideas," the
courts expand upon their initial inquiry to require not only an
independent source of creation, but a specific kind of creation. In
fact, the courts often explicitly state that only original expression
may be protected, apparently employing the term "original" in the
vernacular.14 0 As the court stated in Lotus Development Corp. v.
Paperback Software International, "[T]he issue of copyrightability
137. At least one court has made a doctrinal link between the idea versus expression dichotomy
and the issue of originality, emphasizing that the very reason ideas are excluded from copyright
protection is because they cannot be said to have originated with the author. See Miller v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 650 F.2d 1365, 1368-69 (5th Cit. 1981) ("This dichotomy ... derives from the
concept of originality which is the premise of copyright law.... [S]ince [ideas] do not owe their
origin to any individual, they may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain available to
every person."). Also, in Feist Publications, Inc., the United States Supreme Court explained that
Congress, in order to clarify that originality is the central requirement for copyrightability, replaced
section 3 of the 1909 Copyright Act-which did not identify originality as the basis for determining
the copyrightability of a work's components parts-with section 102(b) of the 1976 Act which
specifically lists aspects of a work which are not original and therefore uncopyrightable. 111 S. Ct.
at 1290-91.
138. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988).
139. See, e.g., Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 741-42 (9th Cir.
1971) (Copyright prohibits expression of an idea in a copyrighted work, but not use of the idea
itself).
140. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 65 (D. Mass.
1990) ("The issue here is whether [plaintiff's computer program] ... includes substantial elements
of expression, distinctive and original, which are thus copyrightable .... ); Concrete Machinery Co.
v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, 843 F.2d 600,606 (1st Cit. 1988) (quoting Sooling Sys. & Flexibles v.
Stuart Radiator, 777 F.2d 485, 491 (9th Cir. 1985) ("An artist can claim to own only an original
manner of expressing ideas .... "); Kamar Int'l Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th
Cir. 1981) ("Anyone can copyright anything, if he adds something original to its expression....");
see also Feist Publications v. Rural Tel. Serv., 111 . Ct. 1282, 1290-91 (1991) ("The question that
remains is whether [the respondent] selected, coordinated, or arranged these uncopyrightable facts in
an original uwy.") (emphasis added).
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of a 'work' turns not on whether the work expresses ideas but
instead on whether, in addition to expressing one or more ideas, in
some material respect it does more, and in an original way." ''
Under American law, therefore, even an author who toils
independently will not generally receive protection for his or her
prosaic rendering of common ideas. 4 ' The author must convey
the ideas through original expression.
This distinction between idea and expression takes on great
importance in infringement actions. Specifically, because it is often
difficult for the plaintiff in an infringement case to show with
direct evidence 4 ' that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work,
American courts permit such copying to be demonstrated
inferentially through the comparison of works. 144 In particular, a
plaintiff may show copying by demonstrating that the defendant
had access to the plaintiff's work or that the defendant's work
contained similarities to the plaintiff's work probative of
copying. 145 Access to a work apparently is shown easily and, in
many cases, admitted by the defendant. 146  The similarity or
probative similarity inquiry, by contrast, requires the court to
141. 740 F. Supp. at 59-60 (emphasis added).
142. As one court stated, "'Ideas are free to the world, and one person's idea can be
appropriated by another with impunity." Taylorv. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 115 F. Supp. 156,
157 (S.D. Cal. 1953); see Cable News Network v. Video Monitoring Serv., 940 F.2d 1471, 1478-79
(1 th Cir. 1991) (stressing the importance of "public access to discussion, debate, and dissemination
of information and ideas').
143. "Direct evidence" of copying would include, for instance, proof that the defendant had
actually made a servile copy of the plaintiffs work, or the defendant's admission of having copied
the plaintiffs work.
144. See David Nimmer et al., Analying Substantial Similarity in Computer Software
Infringement Cases, 6 COMPUTER LAW. 17, 17-18 (1989).
145. Some courts have held that a plaintiff can show copying by demonstrating access and
substantial similarity. See, e.g., Evans v. Wallace Berrie & Co. 681 F. Supp. 813, 815-816 (S.D. Fla.
1988) ("Mo prove, by way of inference, that a defendant copied [plaintiff's protected work, plaintiff
must show that] defendants had access to the plaintiff's work and that the defendants' works are
'substantially similar' to plaintiff's .... "). However, by requiring a finding of substantial similarity,
this analysis conflates the initial inquiry of whether copying has occurred with the subsequent
question of whether the copied material (if protected under copyright) was substantial and therefore
infringing. See Alan Latman, "Probative Similarity " as Proof of Copying: Toward Dispelling Some
Myths in Copyright Infringement, 90 COLuM. L REv. 1187, 1204 (1990) (calling the initial inquiry
regarding copying one of probative similarity and the subsequent question of infringement one of
substantial similarity.).
146. Nimmer et al., supra note 144, at 17-18.
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determine whether the defendant's work has enough in common
with the plaintiff's work to conclude that copying has occurred.147
Once a court establishes that copying has occurred, it must also
determine whether the material the defendant copied was
protectable under copyright and, if so, whether such material was
substantial. 14  Since the defendant is free to use any
noncopyrightable ideas, the court may not rely on similarities
between ideas stated in the two works to demonstrate substantial
similarity. Rather, the court must ascertain which aspects of the
plaintiff's work constitute protected expression, and compare the
material the defendant copied to these for substantial similarity.
149
The idea versus expression dichotomy is thus the principal doctrine
American courts use to distinguish between those aspects of a work
a second comer may imitate freely and those which he must recast
with enough authorial flair to avoid an ultimate finding of
infringement.
Venerable as its position in American jurisprudence may
be t 50 the idea versus expression dichotomy is problematic,
especially in its application to technologies such as computers.
Even in cases pertaining to traditional literary works, American
147. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468-69 (2d Cir. 1946) ("If there is evidence of
access and similarities exist, then the trier of facts must determine whether the similarities are
sufficient to prove copying .. "); see also Latman, supra note 145, at 1193 ("This indirect proof
or circumstantial evidence consists of 'similarities . . . sufficient to prove copying' which are
'usually' accompanied by proof of 'access'...
148. Latman, supra note 145, at 1189.
149. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1360 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Data East USA, Inc. v.
Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 208 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[No substantial sinillarity of expression will be
found when the idea and its expression are inseparable, given that protecting the expression in such
circumstances would confer a monopoly of the idea upon the copyright owner ... "); Hoehling v.
Universal Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972, 977 (2d Cir. 1980) ("Ordinarily, wrongful appropriation is
shown by proving a 'substantial similarity' of copyrightable expression...."); Spectravest, Inc. v.
Mervyn's, Inc., 673 F. Supp. 1486, 1491 (N.D. Cal. 1987) ("A finding of mere similarity of ideas,
no matter how absolute the evidence of access, will lead to a determination of no infringement. A
finding of similarity of expression will result in a finding of infringement .... ).
150. Notably, the EC Council of Ministers too has recognized the idea versus expression
distinction as an appropriate benchmark for the copyrightability of computer programs. "Protection
in accordance with this Directive shall apply to the expression in any form of a computer program.
Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer program, including those which
underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive." Directive, supra note 12,
art. 1.
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courts have long conceded that the threshold between idea and
expression evades precise definition.151 A court's decision, as
Judge Learned Hand once warned, will inevitably be ad hoc. 152
Drawing the line, it turns out, does not involve an objective legal
decision so much as a spontaneous policy judgment.153 The courts
enjoy great discretion: by characterizing the idea of a particular
work broadly, they limit the scope of protection and assure
extensive public access to the knowledge or information at stake;
by describing a work's idea more narrowly, they grant an author
liberal protection and restrict public access.154 When computer
technologies are the subject matter in question, the stakes for the
industry may be high. A court's decision to identify key elements
of a computer technology as original expression may restrict or
even eliminate the industry's access to that technology.
4. Applying the Idea Versus Expression Dichotomy to
Computer Programs
Although American courts recognize that the idea versus
expression distinction is something of a clumsy doctrine by which
to determine copyrightable elements, they have not forsaken the
approach.155 Instead, they have developed several specific
151. See, e.g., Goodson-Todman Enter. v. Kellogg Co., 358 F. Supp. 1245, 1246 (C.D. Cal.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 513 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975) ("It has not been possible to develop
an objective and articulable standard... [to determine] whether material in a creative work is an
'idea' or an 'expression.' "); see also Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Kroffi: An Expression of New
Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN F9RN. V. L. RLy. 109, 126 (1980) (contending that there is no
meaningful difference between idea and expression).
152. Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d Cir. 1960).
153. "Idea," in effect, becomes a judicial metaphor for the public pool of knowledge, whereas
-expression" represents the stylized creation over which an author may obtain temporary dominion.
See Paul Goldstein, Infringement of Copyright in Computer Programs, 47 U. Prir. L REV. 1119,
1126 (1986) ("[l]n the copyright lexicon, 'idea' is no more than a metaphor for elements generally
belonging in the public domain.").
154. See Digital Communications Assoc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449, 458
(N.D. Ga. 1987) ("The inherent problem with applying the idea.. versus expression... distinction
to any specific case is defining the underlying idea.").
155. See, e.g., Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 663 F. Supp. 706,712 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)
(citing Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 912 (1980)) (The idea versus expression
"distinction, although an imprecise tool, has not yet been abandoned because we have as yet
discovered no better way to reconcile the two competing societal interests that provide the rationale
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guidelines to render their analysis less arbitrary. These guidelines
include (a) the abstractions test, (b) the plurality of expressions test,
and (c) the "functional/expressive" and "essential/non-essential"
distinctions. While these may be appropriate criteria for separating
idea from expression in conventional literary and artistic works,
they do not cover the full range of policy issues courts must
consider when analyzing copyright protection of computer
technologies.
The abstraction test, conceived by Judge Hand in Nichols v.
Universal Pictures Corp.,156 separates idea from expression by
describing a continuum of expression. At one end of the
continuum, ideas are communicated in general fashion. At the other
end, they are conveyed in specific form. The abstraction test
enables courts to select a point along this continuum where the
copyrightability of a work begins. Judge Hand wrote:
Upon any work and especially upon a play a great number
of patterns of increasing generality will fit equally well, as
more and more of the incident is left out. The last may
perhaps be no more than the most general statement of
what the play is about and at times consists only of its title,
but there is a point in this series of abstractions where they
are no longer protected since otherwise the playwright
could prevent the use of his ideas to which apart from their
expression his property never extended.157
As this quotation reflects, the abstractions scale does not specify
the point where copyright commences but, instead, provides a
general index under which courts determine copyrightability on a
case-by-case basis.158 Even today, courts refuse to stipulate a rule
for the granting of and restrictions on copyright protection, namely, both rewarding individual
ingenuity, and nevertheless allowing progress and improvements based on the same subject matter
by others than the original author.").
156. 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1960).
157. Id. at 121.
158. Nimmer et al., supra note 144, at 20.
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which would establish an arbitrary summa divisio along Hand's
scale of abstraction.159
Although Judge Hand developed the abstraction test for analysis
of traditional literary works, one court recently applied it to
computer programs. In Lotus Development Corp., a case in which
several aspects of the defendants' VP-Planner electronic
spreadsheet program were found to have infringed the plaintiff's 1-
2-3 program, the court first noted that:
At the most general level of Hand's abstraction scale, the
computer programs at issue in this case ... are expression
of the idea of a computer program. . . . [E]ven though
programs like VisiCalc, 1-2-3, Multiplan, SuperCalc4, and
Excel are very different in their structure, appearance, and
method of operation, each is, at the most basic level, just a
different way of expressing the same idea: the electronic
spreadsheet."6
Yet, the court refused to conclude that the basic concept of these
programs-an accounting spreadsheet-was the idea and that all
other aspects represented copyrightable expression. Rather, the
court proposed that other characteristics of the programs, more
specific than the concept of an accounting spreadsheet, might also
represent noncopyrightable ideas. "These products," the court
explained, "also share some elements ... at a more detailed or
specific point along the abstractions scale.... Among such
elements, the court considered the rotated "L" format of the
spreadsheet screen display. To determine whether the format was
idea or expression, however, the court could not rely solely on
Hand's hypothetical abstractions scale.12 Instead, the court
applied the plurality of expressions test. Under this test, the greater
159. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 60 (D. Mass.
1990) ("It seems the better part of wisdom, if not valor, not to press the search for a suitable bright-
line test of copyrightability where Learned Hand, even after decades of experience in judging, found
none.").
160. Id. at 65.
161. Id. at 66.
162. The obvious shortcoming of the abstraction scale is that it simply provides courts another
metaphor by which to visualize levels of specificity in a work. It is not instructive as to where along
the scale an author's original expression begins.
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the range of ways an idea might be expressed, the more probable
an author's particular expression of it will receive protection. The
converse of this test is the doctrine of merger: If an idea may be
expressed in only one way, or in a limited number of ways, such
expression cannot be copyrighted since, according to the doctrine,
it has merged with the underlying idea.163 In Lotus Development
Corp., since alternatives to the rotated "L" format were few, the
court found merger: "[T]here is a rather low limit, as a factual
matter, on the number of ways of making a computer screen
resemble a spreadsheet. Accordingly, this aspect of electronic
spreadsheet computer programs, if not present in every expression
of such a program, is present in most expressions. 164 The
rotated "L" format, the court therefore concluded, was a
noncopyrightable idea.
Likewise, Lotus Development Corp. applied the plurality of
expressions test to determine whether use of the "/" key to invoke
the plaintiff's menu command system constituted copyrightable
expression. Because most of the letter, number, and arithmetic keys
had other specific purposes, using the "/" key to call up the menu,
the court decided, was "one of very few practical options."'16 As
it could only be expressed in a limited number of ways, the court
concluded, this aspect of the plaintiff's work "merge[d] with the
idea of having a readily available method of invoking the menu
command system, ' ' 166 and thus could not be protected.
163. In the context of computer litigation, the plurality of expressions test was rust set forth
by the Third Circuit in Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984): '[I]f the same idea can be expressed in a plurality of
totally different manners, a plurality of copyrights may result and no infringement will exist... If
other methods of expressing that idea are not foreclosed as a practical matter, then there is no
merger." Id. at 1253; see Johnson Controls Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175
(9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir.
1971)) ('Where an idea and the expression merge or are inseparable, the expression is not given
copyright protection.").
164. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 66 (1990).
165. Id.
166. Id.; cf Allen-Myland Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machines Corp., 770 F. Supp. 1004, 1011 (_.D.
Pa. 1991) (IBM's microcode tape was original since "IBM could have written [it] in a number of
ways other than the particular mode of expression [IBM] ultimately selected.").
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Despite these instances of merger, the court found that the
menu command structure of Lotus 1-2-3 included other aspects
which were "distinctive details of expression." 1 7 For instance,
the court noted that the program's menu command line, reading
"Command: BCDEFGIMPRSTVW,"" 68 constituted protectable
expression:
This particular expression of a menu structure is not
essential to the electronic spreadsheet idea, nor does it
merge with the somewhat less abstract idea of a menu
structure for an electronic spreadsheet. The idea of a menu
structure-including the overall structure, the order of
commands in each menu line, the choice of letters, words,
or "symbolic tokens" to represent each command.., and
the long prompts-could be expressed in a . . . literally
unlimited number of ways." 9
Accordingly, the court concluded that, in spite of the program's
merged aspects, the Lotus 1-2-3 menu command structure, viewed
as a whole,17 1 was an "original and non-obvious way of
expressing a command structure." 17'
The plurality of expressions doctrine, as Lotus Development
Corp. reflects, is closely linked to the notion of creative choice. If
a computer developer selects a particular formulation of an idea
from a broad range of alternatives, the resulting work will likely
embody original expression or what one court recently termed
"stylistic creativity. ' 172 Where only a singular expression is
possible, by contrast, the courts find a lack of choice and,
therefore, a lack of originality. Thus, in Data East USA, Inc. v.
167. 740 F. Supp. at 67.
168. Each of the capitalized letters, or "symbolic tokens" as Lotus termed them, referred to
a specific command such as Blank, Clear, Delete, and Edit. Id.
169. Id.
170. "If particular characteristics not distinctive individually have been brought together in a
way that makes the 'whole' a distinctive expression of an idea-one of many possible ways of
expressing it-then the whole may be copyrightable." Id.
171. Id. at 68.
172. See Digital Communications, Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449,462 (N.D.
Ga. 1987) (Status screen of plaintiff's communications software deemed copyrightable because it
included "considerable stylistic creativity and authorship above and beyond the ideas embodied in
the status screen.") (emphasis added).
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Epyx, Inc.,173  for instance, the Ninth Circuit found that
similarities between defendant's World Karate Championship video
game and plaintiff's Karate Champ1 74 stemmed from conventions
of the Karate game rather than from defendant's pirating of
plaintiff's creative choices: "After careful consideration and
viewing of these features, we find that they necessarily follow from
the idea of a martial arts Karate combat game, or are inseparable
from, indispensable to, or even standard treatment of the idea of
the Karate sport. As such, they are not protectable. ' ' 175 As this
decision indicates, where a court detects a narrow range of possible
expression, such court is unlikely to find that a given author has
made the kinds of creative choices which manifest originality and
thus justify copyright.
Besides measuring the sphere of creative choices available to
an author, American courts analyze the issue of originality by
identifying particular constraints which may completely eliminate
opportunities for authorial imagination.17 6 If an author's choice
is coerced, it obviously has not originated with the author and
173. 862 F.2d. 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
174. Examples of these similarities were that each game had fourteen moves, a two player
option, a low kick, an upper-lunger punch, and one referee. Id. at 209.
175. Id.; see Mason v. Montgomery Data, 765 F. Supp. 353, 355 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (Land-
ownership maps were not copyrightable since they were the "only pictorial presentation which could
result from a correct interpretation of the legal description and other factual information"); Secure
Serv. Tech. v. Time & Space Processing, 772 F. Supp. 1354, 1362-63 (E.D. Va. 1989) (general
composition of protocol specifying content of binary signals for facsimile machine did not include
"sufficient choice and selection to qualify for copyright protection.").
176. This doctrine-recognizing that a computer developer may emulate aspects of existing
programs because of external constraints rather than his lack of imagination-is the heartland of the
courts' originality analysis. In most copyright cases concerning computer programs today, the alleged
infringer has not slavishly copied source code, the literal representation of the program in question.
Instead, the alleged infringer has generally drafted separate code generating an exterior result which
resembles nonliteral attributes of the plaintiff's program, such as its structure, sequence, and
organization. The threshold originality requirement, therefore, is generally not in issue. Rather, the
question is whether the defendant, by imitating nonliteral aspects of plaintiff's program, appropriated
elements necessary to make the program work, or whether the infringer borrowed fanciful elements
of expression. While the courts seem to agree that necessary elements should not be protected, they
do not yet apply a consistent set of rules addressing the particular restraints on expression which
affect computer programmers. In Part VI, such a set of rules is proposed for international application.
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cannot be viewed as his or her own expression.'"7 In the
computer programming arena, courts have acknowledged that
functional requirements may compel specific programming
solutions, thwarting opportunities for individual expression. Where
a particular aspect of a program is necessary to the program's
proper functioning, courts treat it as an uncopyrightable idea.' 78
These ideas, of course, are the building blocks upon which
programmers rely to develop competitive programs.
One of the principal constraints on expression courts recognize
derives from the useful article doctrine. Unlike France's Law of
1957, which does not explicitly state such a limitation on
copyright,179  the Copyright Act of 1976 specifies that purely
utilitarian elements of a useful article's design cannot be
copyrighted:
[T]he design of a useful article... shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work [which is
copyrightable] . . . if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features
that can be identified separately from, and are capable of
existing independently of, the utilitarian aspects of the
article."1'
177. See, e.g., Apple Computer Inc. v. Franklin Comp. Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1253 (3d Cir.
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) ("[C]opyright protection will not be given to a form
of expression necessarily dictated by the underlying subject matter.") (emphasis added).
178. See Whelan Assoc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., 797 F.2d 1222, 1236 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987) ("Mhe purpose or function of a utilitarian work would be the work's
idea, and everything that is not necessary to that purpose or function would be part of the expression
of the idea.").
179. Although the Law of 1957 does not state such a rule, French courts, based on article 2,
paragraph 2 of the Law of July 14, 1909 on drawings and models, have recognized an analogous
doctrine under droit d'auteur. That provision states: "[I]f the elements constitutive of the novelty of
the drawing or model are inseparable from those of the invention... such object may only be
protected (under the law on patents]." ("[S]i les eMments constitutifs de la nouveaut du dessin ou
modle sont insiparables de ceux de l'inventon ... ledit objet ne peut itre protigd que [par la loi
sur les brevets]."). French courts have used the underlying principle of this provision to refuse
protection, under the Laws of 1957 and 1985, to objects whose form or expression is inseparable
from their useful function. See Bertrand, La Protection Juridique des Interfaces en Droit Franfais,
25 CAHEERS DU DROIT D'AUTEUR, Mar. 1990, at 1, 3.
180. Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Paperback Software Int'l, 740 F. Supp. 37, 52 (1990) (citing 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988)) (defining pictoral, graphic, and sculptural works).
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Courts have applied this provision to deny copyright for the design
of a bicycle rack,181 of mannequins used to display clothing," 2
and of a wire-spoked automobile wheel cover.' Apparently,
these articles had certain aesthetic features which, because they
were physically and conceptually inseparable from the useful or
functional features of such articles, 184  were not viewed as
incorporating the kind of creative choices copyright protects.'85
In Lotus Development Corp., the court directly linked the useful
article limitation to the idea versus expression dichotomy:
The expression of an idea is copyrightable only if it is
original-that is, if the expression originated with the author.
Even then the expression of the idea is not copyrightable if
the expression does no more than embody elements of the
idea that are functional in the utilitarian sense.8 6
The converse of this proposition, the court underscored, is that:
"[Tihose elements of a useful article that can exist independently
of the utilitarian aspects of the article are potentially copyrightable
because those elements are elements of expression that can be
distinguished from the utilitarian functions of the article."'8 7
Thus, the court equated the utilitarian requirements of a
program-those essential to its function-with ideas, and all other
aspects, conceived independently of such constraints, as expression.
The difficulty courts have in applying this doctrine is two-fold.
First, courts have not developed a dependable method for
181. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
182. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
183. Norris Indus. v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (lth Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 (1983).
184. See Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 594 F. Supp. 364, 370 (E.D.N.Y.
1984), aff'd, 773 F.2d 411, 414 (2d Cir. 1985) ("A useful article may be copyrighted only to the
extent that there is a physically or conceptually separable work of art embellishing it.").
185. Notably, the useful article doctrine is not about the number of choices available to a
creator, but about the kind of choice available to the creator. Even where a creator was able to choose
among multiple design possibilities, a court applying the doctrine must determine whether such
creator included certain features to express an aesthetic choice (copyrightable), or to implement a
purely utilitarian design decision (not copyrightable). See Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pae. Lumber
Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[Cjopyrightabiity ultimately should depend on the extent
to which the work reflects artistic expression uninhibited by functional considerations.").
186. 740 F. Supp. at 58.
187. Id. at 52.
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determining what a program's function is. The courts must select
a definition for a program's function according to the same kind of
abstraction scale they use in defining a work's idea. By way of
example, the reader might imagine a program which enables a
musician to compose music by tapping phrases into an electronic
keyboard while observing the results of his playing notated on a
personal computer screen. Now, suppose that International Business
Machines Corp. (IBM) developed such a program for use on an
IBM personal computer (PC) interfacing with a Casio piano.
Suppose too that Samuel, a software developer, later created an
improved version of the same program, with additional features.
Finally, suppose that, although Samuel drafted his source code
independently, Samuel found that, to achieve the proper interface
between the piano and PC, he was obliged to use code substantially
similar to the interface instructions in the existing IBM program.
If a court were later required in an infringement case brought by
IBM to determine the function of IBM's music writing program,
the court might do so in a variety of ways. The function might be
considered the efficient composition of music. Alternatively, it
might be viewed as the efficient composition of music through the
use of an electronic keyboard and a personal computer. More
specific yet, the function might be deemed the efficient
composition of music through the use of a Casio keyboard and an
IBM PC. Each of these characterizations of the program's function
would alter the court's ultimate conclusion as to which aspects of
IBM's program were essential. Only in the last case would
Samuel's use of substantially similar code likely be deemed
permissible since it would probably be considered essential to
making the Casio piano interface properly with the IBM PC.
The second problem courts have in applying the doctrine is
determining the meaning of words such as "necessary" and
"essential." These are subjective terms. Returning to the above
example, suppose that IBM's music writing program had a
scrolling feature allowing the musician to compose along a singular
horizontal axis, so that as he composed, there would be absolutely
no breaks in the notation which appeared on the screen display.
Suppose also that Samuel independently drafted source code which
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
introduced the same scrolling feature into his program. Should this
scrolling feature be considered necessary to the function, for
instance, of efficient music composition on a personal computer?
One court might decide this feature is not necessary to the
program's function; traditionally, music was drafted on separate
sheets of staff paper. Accordingly, Samuel had the option of
creating a program that used a line-by-line approach wherein, after
the musician types a certain number of lines of music, the
computer would advance to a subsequent screen. By contrast, a
second court might find that scrolling is an essential functional
element of any music composition program; a musician must be
able to compose continuously, without being interrupted even by
momentary page breaks. The first court would categorize the
scrolling feature as an element of protectable expression, whereas
the second would view it as a necessary part of the program's
function, that is, an uncopyrightable idea.
Absent a systematic approach to their analysis, the courts have
inordinate latitude to define a program's function and discern those
aspects of the program essential to its function. Undoubtedly, it is
close to impossible for the courts to develop a bright-line test for
identifying a program's function.18 But there is no reason the
courts should not apply an orderly set of guidelines to assist them
in distinguishing essential, utilitarian components of a program
from elements of authorial expression, the original creations
copyright seeks to encourage and protect. Part 11I.C suggests that
French courts also fail to distinguish carefully such protectable and
nonprotectable program elements.
188. As explained above, defining a program's function is as elusive an undertaking as
attempting to define its idea. Accordingly, this aspect of the analysis should probably be left to the
wisdom of individual courts. See supra notes 151-54.
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C. Finding Originality in Computer Programs Under French Law
1. Computer Programs as Oeuvres de l'esprit Under the Laws
of 1957 and 1985
Under France's Law of 1957, legal protection is granted to so-
called "oeuvres de l'esprit." Article 2 of the Law of 1957 states:
"The provisions of the present law protect the rights of authors
with respect to all oeuvres de l'esprit, regardless of their genre, the
form of their expression, their merit, or their purpose." 18 9 Just as
the term "work of authorship" is left undefined in the American
copyright statute, the term "oeuvre de l'esprit" referred to in
articles 1 and 2 of the Law of 1957 is never specifically
explained.19° However, in article 3 of the Law, a
nonexhaustive 9' list of works which constitute oeuvres de
l'esprit is set forth. Originally, this list included books, brochures,
and other literary, artistic, and scientific writings, cinematographic
works, speeches, dramatic works, photographic works, lithographs,
musical compositions, applied arts, and illustrations. Under the Law
of 1985, the French legislature expanded the list specifically to
include, along with several other categories of works,1" computer
software.
Even after this list was expanded, however, courts have
struggled to determine the precise meaning of "oeuvres de
l'esprit" and ascertain when, and to what degree, such works
should receive protection. Since the statute itself does not state
what qualities render a work an oeuvre de l'esprit, courts have
relied primarily on legal theory to make this determination.
189. Law of 1957, art. 2 ("Les dispositions de la prisente loiprotdgent les droits des auteurs
sur routes les oeuvres de l'espri4 quels qu'en soient le genre, laforme d'expression, le mirite ou la
destination.").
190. See DESBOIS, supra note 70, at 3-4.
191. The fact that the French legislature intended the list to be nonexhaustive is signaled by
the term "notably" (notamment) placed before the list of protected works.
192. In particular, the legislature added protection for animated cinematographic works, circus
acts, graphic and typographic works, enlarged the category of photographic works protected, and
designated a new broad category of audiovisual works. Law of 1985, tit. 1, arts. Iv.
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According to the minority position, an oeuvre de l'esprit is
necessarily a literary or artistic work. One proponent of this
position reasons that, because the title of the Law of 1957 indicates
the Law covers literary and artistic property, a work must have a
literary or artistic character to qualify as a protectable oeuvre de
l'esprit9 ' To win the Law's protection, the theory goes, a work
must be cultural or aesthetic.194 Purely technical or commercial
works, proponents of this position conclude, were not traditionally
considered oeuvres de l'esprit, and therefore should not receive
protection under the Law of 1957.195
The majority of French scholars disagree with this
characterization of oeuvres de l'esprit under the Law of 1957. The
legislature, they argue, never explicitly stated that a work had to be
aesthetic or cultural to be protected under the law.'96 Rather, in
article 2 of the Law of 1957, the legislature made clear its
indifference to the genre, 197  form, 198  merit,199  and
193. See Plaisant, supra note 60, Fasc. 301, at 18.
194. Id. But cf. Judgment of March 7, 1986, Cass. ass. pldn., 1986 D.S. 405 concl. Cabannes
et note Edeliman ("[L]egal protection extends to any work stemming from original intellectual
creation independent of any aesthetic considerations.") ("ILia protection ldgale s'etend d toute
oeuvre procddant d'une crdation intellectuelle originale indipendamment de toute considdration
d'ordre esthitique."); DEsBois, supra note 70, at 54.57 ("mhe originality determination suffices:
protection is assured whether the work has a utilitarian or cultural purpose.") ("[Lia constatation
de lVorlginalitd suffit: la protection est assurde, que l'oeuvre ait une destination utilitaire ou
culturelle.").
195. Plaisant, supra note 60, FAsc, 301, at 9-10.
196. In fact, the Law of 1957 does not even provide a definition of literary or artistic works.
197. "'Genre" refers to the category of work- Under traditional theory, there were three possible
genres: letters, music, and the fine arts. Or, as article 7 of the Law of 1790 stated: "[A]ny production
of imagination or genius belongs to the Beaux-Arts." ("[Toute production de l'esprit ou du ge'nle
appartenant aux Beaux-Arts."). See COLOMBEr, supra note 41, at 32.
198. "'Form" refers to the particular means through which a work is expressed. COLOMBmE,
supra note 41, at 32. For instance, a musical work will be protected whether written for instrument
or voice; a sculpture whether created in marble or bronze; a literary piece whether drafted in writing
or spoken. Il
199. "Merit" refers to the intellectual, artistic, or aesthetic qualities of a work. Id In theory,
a judge must not evaluate such qualities in a work since, to do so, would be to impose his personal
tastes upon the public and thus perpetrate a sort of censorship. However, some commentators suggest
that the merit of a work must be assessed on some level since, otherwise, the scope of protection
under the Law of 1957 would become excessively broad. See, e.g., PLAIsANT, supra note 40, at 22.
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purpose2" of a work, simply requiring that the work constitute an
oeuvre de l'esprit, the creative production of an individual.
Although most courts have accepted this expansive notion of
oeuvre de l'esprit, a few courts have tried to limit it, requiring that
works possess an obvious literary, artistic, or aesthetic quality.2"'
More important, almost all French courts and commentators
seem to agree that, in order to be a protectable oeuvre de l'esprit,
a work must express its creator's personality. This additional
requirement, springing from the same author-centered values from
which authors' moral rights derive, is set forth under two doctrines.
First, to be protected, a work must demonstrate originality. 2
Originality, for purposes of the Law of 1957, exists when a work
incorporates its creator's unique personality. The work, it is
generally said, must bear the "impress of the creator's
personality."2 Second, only a creator's personal expression may
be protected, not underlying ideas or thoughts which exist
independent of the creator's personal output.20" This second
concept is obviously analogous to the idea versus expression
dichotomy set forth in the Copyright Act of 1976 and applied by
American courts examining the issue of originality. However, as
will be discussed further below, French courts rarely mention the
dichotomy when analyzing whether specific elements of a work
should be protected and do not generally attempt, as do American
courts, to discern the fine line between idea and expression. Rather,
200. By eliminating the purpose restriction on copyrightable subject matter, the legislature
codified the so-called "Unity of Art" doctrine. See Jane C. Ginsburg, French Copyright Law, 36 .
COPYRIoHT Soc'y 269, 273 (1989). Under this doctrine, whether a work is pure art, or art integrated
into an entity which will ultimately serve some utilitarian purpose, the work may be protected under
the Law of 1957. kL; see COLomBEr, supra note 41, at 34-35.
201. A classic example is the refusal of the Paris Appeals Court (Cour d'appel) to provide
protection to the formula for a perfume scent which, the court decided, was an industrial creation
lacking the requisite aesthetic attributes of an oeuvre de l'esprit. See Plaisant, supra note 60, Fasc.
303, at 10 (citing Judgment of July 3, 1975, Trib. of Paris, 1976 D.S., soum. 19; 91 R.I.D.A., Jan.
1977, at 108).
202. DEsBOIS, supra note 70, at 86.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. M, at 22-31; C. Brossand & P. Durnerin, L'absence de protection des idles par le droit
d'auteur, 1988 GAZErrE DU PALAIS [G.P.] 69-72 (ler ser.) (Fr.).
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French courts rely almost exclusively on the notion of originality
to determine what aspects of a work merit protection.
The provisions of the Law of 1985 extending legal protection
to computer software reveal an awkward fit between the ideal of an
oeuvre de l'esprit, creation emanating from an author's person, and
the reality of mass-marketed high technologies. It should be noted
that, before the law was passed, a government commission had
recommended that computer software be protected pursuant to a sui
generis or neighboring rights statute." 6 However, the Special
Committee of the French National Assembly which reviewed the
proposal rejected the sui generis option, 7 and instead set forth,
on April 4, 1984, a set of amendments which would place
computer software under the traditional rubric of droit
d'auteur."' The legislature made this decision in the face of
considerable controversy, some of which still exists today.
In addition to the crucial provision in Title I of the Law of
1985 conferring protection to computer software2' under French
droit d'auteur, Title V thereof, entitled "Software" ("Les
206. Specifically, the National Institute of Industrial Property (L'institut National de la
Proprlet6 Industrielle) proposed the implementation of a neighboring rights statute setting forth a
high threshold of originality and calling for filing of software in order to establish the date of its
creation. See LUCAS, LE DROIT DE L'INFoRMArrQuE 214 (1987); Hoffman & Grossman, Moral
Rights and Computer Software; An International Overview, 5 Cowv, trrl LAw. 6, 9-16 (1989).
207. Although the National Assembly decided not to create separate legislation, it did
incorporate many of the other suggestions made by the government commission. LUCAS, supra note
206, at 210-14; Hoffman & Grossman, supra note 206, at 9-16.
208. LUCAS, supra note 206, at 210-14; Hoffman & Grossman, supra note 206, at 9-16.
209. Interestingly, France's National Assembly did not indicate exactly what aspects of
computer technology it sought to protect under the Law of 1985. Rather, the legislature simply
referred to the subject matter as "logiciel," which translates roughly as "software." But see Decree
(Arrio) of Dec. 22, 1981 Pertaining to the Enrichment of Computer-Related Vocabulary, Issued by
the Ministry of Industry and the Ministry of National Education, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique
Frangaise [J.O.] at 624 (Jan. 17, 1982) (defining "software" (logiciel) as "the group of programs,
procedures and rules, and ... documentation, involved in the functioning of an information
processing system.") ("iL'ensemble des programmes, procidis et rigles, et... de la
documentation, relatifs aufonctionnement d'un ensemble de traitement de l'information. "). Without
any definition of software included in the Law of 1985, some analysts question whether logiclel
includes such elements as a program's flow charts, manual, the object or source code, or even the
text on the packaging accompanying the software product. See Hoffman & Grossman, supra note
206, at 9-16. Furthermore, if one views the computer as an integral machine in which hardware and
software elements often merge, the Laws of 1957 and 1985, by protecting software, arguably end up
protecting some purely technologic aspects of the computer.
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Logiciels"), introduced seven other significant modifications into
the Law of 1957.2"' Several of these modifications broke
measurably from traditional French legal doctrine pertaining to
authors' rights, demonstrating the incongruities of protecting
software products under provisions intended to protect conventional
literary and artistic property. Perhaps the most astonishing
provision is Title V, article 46 of the Law of 1985, basically
eliminating the moral rights of a software developer: "Unless
otherwise specified, the author may not contest the adaptation of
software to the extent that the author has assigned rights therein,
nor can the author exercise his right to repent or withdraw the
work from publication. ' 21  By taking away the software author's
right to oppose changes in his work (i.e., the right to maintain the
integrity of the work)212 as well as his right to repent or withdraw
it, this provision differs measurably from traditional droit
d'auteur and its emphasis on droit de la personnalit. Under the
Law of 1957, the poet, the painter, and the sculptor, even after
transferring economic rights in their works, can challenge and
prevent so little as trivial alterations which might detract from the
integrity of their personal creation. By contrast, under the Law of
1985, the software developer who assigns economic rights in his or
her work, absent a prior agreement to the contrary, has no recourse
210. In summary, these modifications include: (1) a provision granting employers all rights in
software created by their employees in the discharge of their duties, (2) a provision limiting the
duration of protection for software to 25 years following the software's creation date, (3) a provision
essentially eliminating an author's moral rights following assignment of his work, (4) a provision
prohibiting a software user from making a copy (other than a back-up copy) of the software or using
the software in any way not expressly authorized by the author, (5) a provision stating that rights in
software can be assigned for a lump-sum price, (6) a provision instituting a procedure for enjoining
infringement, and (7) a provision extending protection to those foreign software authors in France
who are nationals or domiciliaries of a country which provides similar protection to French nationals
or domiciliaries. Law of 1985, tit. V.
211. Law of 1985, tit. V, art. 46 ("Saufstipulation contraire, l'auteur ne peut s'opposer d
l'adaptation du logiciel dans la limite des droits qu'il a cid, ni exercer son droit de repentir ou
de retrait.").
212. See Bensoussan, Droitd'Usage, Licence etContrefagon, 129 EXPERrIsES, July 1990,221-
25 (Article 46 eliminates an author's "right to the integrity of his work"); cf. L Stanc, National
Report (France) in Actes du 57 Congrds de I'ALAI 183-96 (1990) (arguing that article 46 removes
an author's "right to the respect of his work").
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under a moral rights theory when the assignee subsequently alters
(or even destroys) such work.
The legislature's decision to eliminate these moral rights is
grounded primarily in its concern for the software user.
Specifically, the legislature foresaw the plethora of practical
problems that would follow if software users, before they could
correct a bug in the software, alter the software to accomplish a
new task, or perform simple maintenance operations, were obliged
to obtain prior approval of the software's author.213 In the
legislature's view, the author's general discretion to grant or refuse
such approval, free of court scrutiny,214 would significantly
conflict with the interests of the software user to modify and
develop the work in accordance with his particular computing
needs. Thus, the legislature chose essentially to withdraw moral
rights from the author of software, eliminating, in this context, the
set of rights which probably represents the most obvious difference
between conventional droit d'auteur and American copyright law.
The Law of 1985 further modifies the distribution of rights
created under the Law of 1957 by setting forth a special rule for
software created by employees in the employment setting. In
particular, Title V, article 45 of the Law of 1985 states: "Unless
otherwise specified, software created by one or several employees
in the exercise of their duties shall belong to the employer, to
whom all of the rights conferred upon authors shall devolve. 215
In many respects, this rule is analogous to the work-made-for-hire
doctrine codified in the 1976 Copyright Act.216 However, no such
213. LucAs, supra note 206, at 256-58.
214. According to at least one decision of France's highest court, a judge may not evaluate the
legitimacy of an author's decision to exercise his moral rights. Judgment of June 5, 1984 (Maddalena
et autres v. Raffin et autres) Cass. civ. Ire, 1984 Bull. Civ., No. 184, at 157 (holding that the Cour
d'appel improperly evaluated the appellants' exercise of the right of paternity).
215. Law of 1985, tit. V, art. 45 ("Sauf stipulation contraire, le logiciel cr66 par un ou
plusleurs employs dans I'exercise de leursfonctions appartient d l'employeur auquel sont divolus
tous les droits reconnus aux aureurs.").
216. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) (defining a "work made for hire" as "a work prepared by an
employee within the scope of his or her employment."). "In the case of a work made for hire, the
employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of
this title, and, unless the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all of the rights comprised in the copyright." 17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988). Notably, these
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provision has existed previously either in the Law of 1957 or under
French jurisprudence pertaining to literary and artistic property.217
By attributing software created in the work setting to the employer
rather than to its true creator, article 45 departs radically from the
well-established notion under French droit d'auteur that the person
who authors a literary or artistic work remains somehow inexorably
linked to his creation.218 Article 45 instead confers all rights upon
the employer, including both economic and, apparently, moral
rights.219 Arguably, this provision is in conflict with article 6 of
the Law of 195720 stating that the author of a work holds certain
moral rights which are perpetual, inalienable, and imprescriptible,
attached to the author's person.221
Reading articles 45 and 46 of the Law of 1985 together, one
detects an unmistakable metamorphosis. The law no longer seems
provisions explicitly attribute both ownership rights and authorship to the employer. See generally
Devaney, Supreme Court Clarifies Application of Work Made for Hire Doctrine, SOFIWARE
PROTECTION, June 1989, at 10-14. Article 45 of the Law of 1985 expresses the same idea more
cryptically: software "shall belong" to the employer who shall obtain "all the rights conferred upon
authors."
217. One might argue that some precedent for such a rule existed before 1985, in that the Law
of 1957 confers property rights in collective works-i.e., works created by several authors at the
initiative and under the control of either an individual or a corporate entity-to the individual or
corporate entity in whose name such work is published (who, presumably, is often the authors'
employer). See Law of 1957, arts. 9, 13. However, the Law of 1957 does not explicitly create a
presumption of ownership in favor of the employer of a collective work's authors.
218. See Edelman, supra note 74; see also Edelman, La Main et L'Esprit, 1980 D.S. cbs. 43-
46.
219. However, some legal observers believe Article 45 only confers economic rights upon the
employer, the moral rights remaining, in accordance with Article 6, with the employee himself. See,
e.g., Judgment of Mar. 7, 1986, Cass. ass. plan., 1986 J.C.P. , No. 14713 observations Mousseron,
Teyssi6, and Vivant. Under this reading of the statute, the moral rights held by the employee would
only be nominal; that is, they would not actually permit the employee to exercise any power over the
work. Id.
220. See Bensoussan, supra note 212, at 226; Hoffman & Grossman, supra note 206, at 10.
In addition, article 45 of the Law of 1985 deviates from the rule set forth in article 21 of the Law
of 1957 stating that- "The author holds during his life the exclusive right to exploit his work in any
form whatsoever and to obtain a pecuniary profit therefrom." ("L'auteurjouitsa vie durantdu droit
exclusif d'exploiter son oeuvre sous quelqueforme que ce soit et d'en tirer un profit picunlaire.").
221. However, one might also argue that any conflict between provisions of the Law of 1985
and those of the Law of 1957 is tempered by the language in article 3 of the Law of 1957 (as
modified by the Law of 1985), granting computer programs status as oeuvres de l'esprit "according
to the terms and conditions defined in [the Law of 1985]." ("selon les modalitds dafinies au titre
V de la loi n* 85-660 du 3 juillet 1985") (emphasis added).
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to vindicate two ideals. Rather, the exigencies of economic
logicm seem to have overwhelmed the law, the legislature having
opted to trim away the personal, author-centered rights traditionally
associated with French droit d'auteur and instead conceive a set of
rules by which efficient transfer of economic rights in computer
software can be carried out. Some commentators have lamented
this evolution in the law as a threat to the unique and historic
identity of droit d'auteur, while others warn that the law's new
emphasis on economic rights may soon be "fatal to a proper
protection for creators." 3 Although it is debatable whether these
provisions of the Law of 1985 do not, in certain instances,
transgress the very fundamentals of French droit d'auteur, they
surely bring French law closer to the essentially one-sided
economic perspective of American law.
2. The Evolution of the Originality Requirement in
French Jurisprudence
Just as France's legislature has modified basic provisions to
assure an appropriate form of legal protection for computer
software, French courts have also reshaped their traditional
approach. Like American courts, French courts are still examining
how best to distinguish protectable elements of authorship from
nonprotectable technologies incident to or required by the computer
art. The chief doctrine French courts apply is the originality
requirement.
Although the Laws of 1957 and 1985 remain unclear on the
224question, courts and scholars specifically condition the legal
protection of oeuvres de l'esprit on originality.'m They base their
222. See Legeals, Le Droit D'Auteur Face aux Nouvelles Technologies, 42 REVuE
INTERNATIONALE DE DRorr COMPARA 677, 690 (1990).
223. Id.
224. Specifically, the term "original'" is mentioned in articles 4,5, and 14 of the Law of 1957.
The Law of 1957 never states, however, that an oeuvre de l'esprit must be original to enjoy
protection under the statute. See Gaudrat, L'Originalides logiciels, 7 CAHrERS LAMY Du DRorr DE
LINFORMATIQUE, Oct. 1989, at 2-8.
225. See B. SAMINo & J. BURST, LE DROIT Du LOxciEL 51 (1990) (stating that courts and
commentators have required originality under French droit d'auteur for almost two centuries).
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rule on a universal conviction that no work may be protected
unless it manifests creation.226 So settled are they in this belief,
they often recite the phrase of Henri Desbois227 proclaiming
originality the "touchstone of copyright.
' 228
While most French scholars agree that droit d'auteur must
include the requirement of originality, there is little consensus
regarding what it actually should entail. As any legal theory
fashioned without particular statutory constraints, the originality
criterion has undergone multiple transformations. Legal
commentators often describe it as something of a doctrinal
blur.229
The classic definition of originality in France finds inspiration
in the personalist conception of authors' rights. As one
commentator explains, that French law grants an author moral
rights (giving the author significant control over a personal
creation) reveals the law's underlying assumption-or
prerequisite-that such personal creation actually exists.
230
Accordingly, a work is said to be original only when it "bears the
imprint of the author's personality. ' 23 1 Some scholars even call
the concept "aesthetic originality," emphasizing that originality
stems from the personal character of an author's work, expressing
his ideas, feelings, and sensibilities.232
When applying these traditional theories, courts evaluate
originality subjectively.233 In particular, the courts scrutinize the
work in isolation to see whether it evinces an imprint of the
author's personality.234 The work need not demonstrate novelty,
the objective criterion which inventions must satisfy under patent
226. Id.; COLOMBET, supra note 41, at 36.
227. Henri Desbois, who passed away in 1985, authored LE DRorr D*AUTEUR EN FRANCE (3d
ed. 1978), probably France's most comprehensive and oft-quoted treatise on copyright.
228. See, e.g., Gaudrat, supra note 224, at 2 (citing DESBOIS, supra note 70, at 11).
229. See, e.g., COLOMBET, supra note 41, at 40 ([Loriginalit... apparaft comme une
notion plutdtfloue. . . .").
230. Gaudrat, supra note 224, at 2.
231. DESBOIS, supra note 70, at 78; SCHAMING & BuRsT, supra note 225, at 58.
232. See, e.g., PLAiSANT, supra note 40, at 27-29.
233. DaSBOIS, supra note 70, at 5-8; ScHAMING & BuRsT, supra note 225, at 58.
234. DEsBOIs, supra note 70, at 5-8; ScmAmINO & BURsT, supra note 225, at 58.
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law. 235 Thus, as Desbois described, two artists can paint the same
scene separately and later both receive protection for their works,
even though the artist who finishes last will not have created
something new or unique. 36 Since both works express the
personality of their creators, both will receive protection.
This subjective, author-centered view of originality is easily
applied to literary, sculptural, and musical works.237 As one
commentator remarked, with these kinds of creation, originality
seems to "flow from its source.''2 8 In cases concerning works
of a technical or scientific nature, by contrast, proof that an author
has somehow imbued the work with his personality is far more
difficult.23 9 Copyright litigation concerning computer software, at
once literary and technological in nature, has tested the flexibility
of this classic criterion of originality, cultivating its rapid evolution.
With the initiation of computer software into the subject matter
of the Law of 1957, some French analysts claim the legal definition
of originality is no longer appropriate. If originality requires an
author to infuse his personality into his work, can a computer
program, they ask, truly meet the test? ° Does the programmer,
they inquire, actually express his personality through the source
code he employs? Moreover, if originality also requires an author's
work to be aesthetic, that it appeal on some level to human
235. The emphasis French legal theory places on this subjective-objective distinction again
points to the author-centered perspective of the law. Originality, when analyzed subjectively, can only
be perceived in the work itself, not by comparing it to anterior works. Although in most cases French
courts continue to analyze each work subjectively to detect evidence of the author's original creation,
in a growing minority of cases pertaining to protection of computer programs, the courts have moved
toward objective analysis. See Lucas, Propri6tdLiattraire tArdsdque, JuRis CLASsEuR Fase. 303-1,
at 6-8 (1986).
236. DESBOIS, supra note 70, at 5-6; cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S.
239, 250 (1903) (concluding that while "[o]thers are free to copy the original... [t]hey are not free
to copy the copy.").
237. Lucas, supra note 235, Fasc. 303-1, at 5.
238. Id.
239. In particular, the theory goes, technical and scientific works provide less room for personal
expression since their primary purpose is to convey factual information. Id. Critics might question
whether such works of technology truly express less than traditional literary and artistic works, or
whether this theory represents the reaction of technically illiterate jurists for whom the expressive
content of such subject matter seems arcane.
240. See, e.g., Judgments of March 7, 1986, Cass. ass. plan., 1986 D.$. 405 note Edelman.
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affections and perception, can machine code, which instructs the
computer electronically rather than stimulating human senses, meet
this criterion too?24' Some commentators respond to these
inquiries in the negative; they would conclude that droit d'auteur
may not be applied to protect computer software without betraying
the aesthetic, author-centered essence of the law. 242 However, the
current trend in French legal theory rejects this view. 243 The
originality requirement, several commentators and France's highest
court now agree,244 can be modified and applied to computer
programs and other advanced technologies without departing
improperly from basic French legal theory.
Several of the recent modifications French courts have made in
the legal requirement of originality incorporate concepts similar to
those American courts use to discuss the issue of originality. First,
French courts have moved away from the personality theory of
creation, acknowledging that sometimes a work may be original
even when it does not readily bear the impress of its author's
personality. In particular, courts now recognize originality where
a work evidences an author's intellectual effort, intellectual work,
or intellectual contribution.245 These standards, silent on the issue
of personality, resemble the locutions of American courts equating
originality with any manifestation of an author's independent
inte,lectual labors. In a recent software infringement case, the
Tribunal de grande instance of Paris concluded that the defendant's
software product was not original and infringed the plaintiff's work
because the defendant's product did not demonstrate sufficient
241. See, e.g., R. Plaisant, La protection du logicielpar le droit d'auteur, GAz. PAL, Sept. 25,
1983.
242. VivANT r AL., supra note 11, at 628-32.
243. Id.
244. Notably, the Socitit Babolat Maillot Wittv. Pachot case, in which the Cour de cassation
concluded that a computer program could be an original oeuvre de l'esprit, arose under the Law of
1957, prior to enactment of the Law of 1985. The Courde cassation decided the case under the Law
of 1957, without applying the newly passed 1985 amendments. In theory at least, therefore, the court
made its decision to protect computer programs under the Law of 1957 independently of the
legislative decision in this regard. See infra notes 255-61 and accompanying text.
245. See Lucas, supra note 235, at 6 (citing cases).
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 5
independent effort.246 The court apparently did not engage in
close, subjective analysis of the defendant's work, but simply
decided that the defendant "did not have the technical and
financial capacity to realize, within one year, an original software
product."247 Thus, instead of inspecting the defendant's work for
signs of personal expression, the court relied on sheer pragmatism:
the defendant's work could not have been original because the
defendant had neither the resources nor the time necessary to have
created such a work.
Second, when analyzing the quantum of authorship contained
in computer programs, French lower courts have begun using terms
traditionally considered to fall within the exclusive domain of
patent law. Like American courts,248 the French courts seem
tempted to analyze the originality of highly technical works by
examining whether such technologies have comparable precedents
in the existing art. For example, in Socidtd Isermatic France v.
Socidtd Gerber,"9 where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant
sold infringing copies of the plaintiff's original R.O.M. modules,
the Cour d'appel of Grenoble defined an original work as one
which: "carries the mark of the intellectual contribution of the
author, that is to say, in which one can recognize an individualized
intellectual effort and an objective character of novelty."'
246. Judgment of Apr. 8, 1987, Paris Trib. gr. inst., 1989 J.C.P., 11, No. 21, cited in Edelman,
Chronique de propritI litraire et aristique. This case shows the tendency of French courts to
analyze whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff's original work by inquiring whether the
defendant's work is originaL Arguably, such analysis obfuscates the essential inquiries of whether
the plaintiffs work is an original (and therefore protectable) oeuvre de l'esprit and whether the
defendant has improperly copied original expression contained in plaintiff's work. See PLAIsANT,
supra note 40, at 140 ("Mhere is infringement in the case where characteristic and original elements
of expression of the fIrst work are found in the second work") ("fijl y a contrefagon dans le cas
oil se retrouvent dans P'oeuvre seconde les dldments caractdristiques et originaux de I'oeuvre
premiere en saforme.").
247. Judgment of Apr. 8,1987, 1989 J.C.P., No. 21, cited in Edeliman, Chronique depropridtd
littiraire et artistique.
248. See infra, notes 310-13.
249. Judgment of Sept. 19, 1989, Grenoble Cours d'appel, 131 Quotidien Juridique (Nov. 6,
1990) at 8-10,pourvoi rejetd, Judgment of Apr. 16,1991, Cass. civ. Ire, 139 ExpRTisPS, May 1991,
at 194-95.
250. Id.
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The Cour d'appel determined that the plaintiff's modules
constituted original oeuvres de l'esprit and that defendant's servile
copies were therefore infringing."5 Although the Cour d'appel's
finding of infringement was justified, its confusion of originality
and novelty, according to the Cour de cassation, was not. 2  On
appeal, the defendant argued, among other things, that since the
originality of software is defined as "the synthesis of the creator's
inventiveness and of novelty," the Cour d'appel should have
determined whether plaintiff's work constituted a "protectable
novelty. ' ' 1 3  The Cour de cassation, upholding the Cour
d'appel's finding of infringement, rejected the defendant's attempt
to introduce the concepts of novelty or inventiveness into the
lexicon of droit d'auteur. The Cour de cassation concluded that the
"notion of a novel invention" has no place in a case brought under
the Law of 1957.2
Third, French courts are beginning to analyze the originality of
computer programs, as do American courts, in terms of the
freedom programmers enjoy to make imaginative choices when
programming. In the landmark Socidtd Babolat Maillot Witt v.
Pachot case, 5s the Cour de cassation set forth a new standard for
originality based on a theory of choice. 6 The court held that a
programmer, like a translator, can manifest his personality through
the decisions he makes: "[P]rogram analysts have to choose, like
251. The defendant admitted that it had directly copied the plaintiffs work. Thus, the court did
not have to consider the issue of copying when assessing plaintiff's infringement claim. rd.
252. Judgment of Apr. 16, 1991, Cass. civ. Ire., 139 EXPERTISES, May 1991, at 194-95.
253. Id. ("[LJoriginalit du logiciel Ise difinisant comme la synthise de 1esprit inventif du
criateur et de la nouveauti,' la cour d'appel devait rechercher si les modules mis au point par
Gerber 'constituaient une nouveautprotfgeable. ').
254. Id
255. Judgment of March 7, 1986, Cass. ass. plen., 1986 J.C.P. II, No. 83-10.477, 20631, note
Mousseruon, Teyssid, and Vivant, 1986, J.C.P. %I No. 1, obs. Vivant and Lucas, D. 1986,405, concl.
Cabannes, and note Edelman.
256. The facts of Pachot are as follows: On his own free time, Jean Pachot, head accountant
for Babolat Maillot Witt (BMW), designed an application program which he used to do accounting
for BMW. When a member of BMW's management later requested to make a back-up copy of the
program, Pachot refused and brought the only existing copy to his home. BMW subsequently
dismissed Pachot from employment. In a subsequent case brought by Pachot challenging his
dismissal, two important collateral issues were whether Pachot was owner of the program and
whether the program constituted an original oeuvre de lesprit. Id
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translators of written works, between diverse modes of presentation
and expression ... their choices thus carry the mark of their
personality. ' ' 1 7 This doctrine follows the reasoning behind the
plurality of expressions test posited in American jurisprudence.
Where a computer programmer can choose between diverse
manners of carrying out a particular operation, his particular
choices embody original expression or, in the parlance of the
France's High Court, the author's personality. 8
The Pachot court also implied that the originality of a computer
program may depend on whether its author has transcended those
forms of expression which stem solely from constraints of
programming logic. The program in question was original, the
court concluded, because its author had "demonstrated a
personalized effort going beyond the simple application of an
automatic and constraining logic" and because the author's effort
"resided in an individualized structure.'' 59 Thus, the court
associated a lack of originality with aspects compelled by
programming "logic," and the presence of originality with
elements reflecting unconstrained, independent programming
decisions.
The court's conclusion-that originality exists where a
programmer has made unfettered programming choices-has met the
criticism of advocates for the traditional personalist approach to
droit d'auteur. Indeed, there is little precedent in French copyright
law suggesting that the freedom to choose is equivalent to
expression of an author's personality. As one commentator notes,
not every choice that an individual makes necessarily is creative or
suggestive of his or her personality.2
257. Id.
258. Id.; see Judgment of April 16, 1991 (Soci& Isermatie France v. Soci 6t Gerber), Cass.
civ. Ire, 139 EXPERTISES, May 1991, at 194-95 (Plaintiff's modules deemed original because they
incorporated plaintiff's "creative choices" and demonstrated plaintiff's "'personal contribution").
259. Id. (emphasis added).
260. See Judgments of Mar. 7, 1986, Cass. ass. pldn., 1986 D.$. 405, at 416 note Edelman. But
cf. Judgment of May 21, 1975, Cass. civ. Ire, 1975 Bull. Civ. I, No. 171, at 145 (price index deemed
original based on its conception, structure and the information presented); Judgment of May 9, 1984,
Grenoble Trib. gr. inst., 1985 D.$., inf. rap. at 309, note Colombet (survey regarding prices in various
department stores deemed original based on its methodology, size, and manner of presenting
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The court's fusion of language reminiscent of the personality
concept, such as "personalized" and "individualized," and
language evoking the labor justification of copyright, such as
"effort" and "contribution" begs further explanation.26' Perhaps
the court's conclusion can be given greater clarity by considering
alternative definitions for personality. If personality is interpreted
according to a vernacular definition-as meaning, for instance, "the
peculiar character traits of a human being"-the court's theory,
linking a programmer's choices to his or her "personality," would
seem rather absurd. An engineer's programming choices obviously
cannot reflect his character traits in the same way, for example,
that the writings of a poet might mirror his unique traits. However,
if the Pachot court's term "personality" is construed as meaning
"that which owes itself to the person" or "coming from the
person," then its theory seems less obscure. Under this second
interpretation, a "personalized" or "individualized" work would
signify something akin to an "original" work under American law,
that is, a work owing its origin to a particular author. Under this
second interpretation, therefore, the court is viewed as adopting a
consonant, labor-oriented approach to droit d'auteur 62
Assuming the court in Pachot intended to state a low-level
independent labor standard of originality, its analysis may prove
troublesome in a second respect. Although it insinuated that the
creative choices available to computer programmers may
sometimes be limited, the Cour de cassation did not clearly
enumerate what such limitations are likely to include. The court
information).
261. In decisions subsequent to Pachot, the Courde cassation has continued to interweave the
labor and personalist conceptions of originality. See Judgment of April 16, 1991 (Socit6 Isermatic
France v. Socidt6 Gerber), Cass. civ. ire, 139 ExPERTisE.S 194-95 (May 1991) (concluding that the
originality of the plaintiffs RLO.M. modules was demonstrated by the plaintiffs personal
contribution).
262. However, in a recent case concerning a compilation of information regarding automobile
companies, the Cour de cassation indicated that evidence of an author's labor does not itself attest
to the originality of the author's work. In particular, the Cour de cassation held that the Cour d'appel
of Douai improperly concluded that the compilation in question was original, failing to specify in
what way its text or graphic form demonstrated the kind of intellectual authorial contribution which
constitutes an original creation. Judgment of May 2, 1989 (S.A.R.L Les Publications pour
l'expansion industrielle v. S.A. Coprosa), Cass. civ. Ire, 1990 J.C.P., No. 1.
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stated that a computer programmer demonstrates originality when
he or she has gone "beyond the simple application of an automatic
and constraining logic." However, the court left it to future
tribunals to determine the specific ways in which an automatic and
constraining logic restrict the range of programming expression.
For instance, should a court applying Pachot consider a computer
program's standard interface instructions an "application of an
automatic and constraining logic?" If a court applying Pachot had
to decide whether use of the customary L-shaped screen display in
a spreadsheet program constitutes an original oeuvre de l'esprit,
would the court be able to determine whether a constraint of logic
compelled such screen display design? In short, because the Cour
de cassation in Pachot refers broadly to the possible constraint of
logic, it remains unclear whether future courts applying Pachot will
consider additional limitations programmers face when developing
software. As Part IV discusses, there are at least four such
limitations courts should systematically consider when examining
the originality of a particular computer technology. If future
tribunals instead read Pachot narrowly and limit their analysis to
the most obvious constraints of programming logic, they may
recognize originality where truly there is none.
3. The Idea Versus Expression Dichotomy Under
French Law
The idea versus expression dichotomy provides French courts
the natural framework under which to broaden their analysis of
originality in computer programs. Imperfect as the dichotomy may
be, it is a central concept not only in American copyright law, but
also in the laws of many member states of the EC. In its Directive,
the Council of Ministers restates the idea versus expression
distinction as an essential limitation on the protection of computer
programs. 63  Although French courts also recognize the
263. See Directive, supra note 12, art. 1 (setting forth the idea versus expression dichotomy);
see also supra note 150. -[O]nly the expression of a computer program is protected .... [I]dcas and
principles which underlie any element of a program, including those which underlie its interfaces,
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distinction, they do not apply it in all cases. In fact, no French
court has specifically distinguished components of a program which
are "idea" from those that are "expression." In cases concerning
computer technologies, French courts appear to have relaxed the
originality requirement, shifting from a strict imprint of the
personality standard to a minimal standard equating originality with
a developer's unconstrained programming choices or personalized
effort.2"4 The originality standard French courts apply has thus
come to resemble closely the independent-effort standard American
courts use when analyzing the narrow legal requirement of
originality. As American courts, therefore, French courts arguably
should also probe the issue of originality under the idea versus
expression construct. Without applying the idea versus expression
dichotomy, or a similar metaphor, French courts will likely extend
protection to aspects of computer programs compelled by purely
practical or technical concerns, aspects which should remain in the
public domain.
Similar to American courts, French tribunals perceive a
distinction between idea and expression. Desbois once wrote:
"Ideas... taken in and of themselves, independently of the form
in which they are conveyed, escape all appropriation. Only the
form under which the idea has been presented, if such form is
original, gives rise to an exclusive right." 2 Desbois's use of the
term "form" has been understood, by French theorists, as meaning
"expression. ' 26  Hence, if one replaces Desbois's term "form"
are not protected by copyright under this Directive ... to the extent that logic, algorithms, and
programming languages comprise ideas and principles, those ideas and principles are not protected
... in accordance with the legislation and jurisprudence of the Member States and the international
copyright conventions, the expression of those ideas and principles is to be protected by copyright."
Id. pmbl.
264. But see Judgment of May 2,1989 ($.A.R.L. Les publications pour l'expansion industrielle
v. S.A. Coprosa), Cass. civ. Ire, 1990 J.C.P., No. 21392 (holding that, to demonstrate the originality
of a compilation of information, a court must specify the textual and graphic elements reflecting the
author's "intellectual contribution").
265. DESBOIS, supra note 70, at 4 ("(L)es idles, comme telle, prises en elles-mimes,
indipendamment de laforme dont elles ont ltd revitues, dchappent ,d toute appropriation. Seule, la
forme, sous laquelle l'ide a ltd prdsentle, donne prise d une exclusivitl, d condition d'lre
originale.").
266. Judgment of Sept. 21, 1983, Paris Trib. gr. inst., 1984 D.S. JuR. 77, note C. Le Stanc.
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with that of "expression," one can frame a rule analogous to
American law's idea versus expression distinction wherein only the
expression of an idea, not the idea itself, may be copyrighted.
Courts in France have invoked the doctrine to refuse protection of
works embodying commonplace ideas,2 67  methods, 268  or
scientific theories.2 69  The doctrine, however, has not been
codified under the Law of 1957.270 Moreover, French courts do
not yet seem to apply the concept with the same regularity or in
the same manner as American courts.
In many cases, instead of using the idea versus expression
dichotomy to identify specifically the protectable aspects of a work,
French courts apply the doctrine broadly to determine whether an
allegedly infringing work has borrowed either ideas or expression
of a prior work. Rather than describing a continuum of abstraction
or a scale of particularity and trying to stipulate where the line
between idea and expression should be drawn, the courts, in such
cases, simply refuse protection to the generalized, trite material
they construe as being "idea."
For instance, in Galardi v. Mitterrand et autres,271 the Paris
Appeals Court (Cour d'appel) rejected an infringement claim
brought by the author of a television show scenario which, the
court found, was based on a banal idea the alleged infringers were
267. See, e.g., Plaisant, supra note 60, Fase. 301, at 19-21 ("Ideas must remain free," in
French, "L'idie dolt itre libre") (citing Judgment of Nov. 29, 1960, Cour de casssation, Annales
de la propridtd industrielle, littdraire et artistique (Ann. prop. ind.) 1961, 309, note Mine. Nlaudstein);
GAZ. PAL., 1961, 1, 152 (Idea for a children's music book is not copyrightable).
268. Ma (citing Judgment of Aug. 2, 1870, Ann. prop. ind. 1870, 22) (An accounting method
is not copyrightable); Judgment of May 4, 1911, Paris Cour d'appel, D. 1912, 2, 182 (A Swedish
gymnastic method is not copyrightable); cf Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1880) (The copyright of
a book on accounting can give rise to copyright of description of the accounting method, but not of
the method itself).
269. See CoLoMnmr, supra note 41, at 29; see also Judgment of Feb. 14, 1990, Paris Cour
d'appel, 1990 D.S., I.R. 72 (holding that the author of a scientific work does not benefit from the
same freedom of expression as the author of a fictional work and is obliged to borrow factual
knowledge conveyed in earlier works).
270. The Law of 1957 has no provision analogous to 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). See supra
note 137. However, some analysts believe article 2 of the Law of 1957, by stating that all works of
authorship are protected under the law "whatever their form of expression," implies that ideas fall
beyond the law's protection. See CoLOMBE, supra note 41, at 27.
271. Judgment of Feb. 12, 1990, Paris Cour d'appel, 1990 D.S., Informations Rapides, 78-79.
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free to imitate. The court first stated: "[T]his simple idea is not
itself able to be protected. . . [The author of the television
program] would have a legitimate infringement claim only insofar
as the elements of the program he put forth were found to have
been copied servilely."'272 Second, the court found that the
appellant's scenario-featuring young artists whose performances
would be observed by other performing artists and a live television
audience-was a commonplace idea which other television shows
had already exploited.273 Finally, the court, by observing that the
appellees' proposed program included a biographical portrait of the
guest star whereas appellant's program did not, concluded that the
work of the appellees was not a servile copy and therefore was not
infringing.274 Notably, the court did not analyze which aspects of
the appellant's work were ideas and which embodied original
expression. Rather, the court simply adjudged the appellant's work
to be hackneyed, hence a nonprotectable idea.
Yet, the idea versus expression analysis of French courts, in
other instances, is far more detailed. For example, in Chavanel v.
Soci't des Editions Plon et autres,27 another recent case decided
by the Paris Cour d'appel, the court specifically differentiated ideas
from expression. The case involved a literary work recounting the
true stories of two news reporters who had observed meerkats (a
type of mongoose) in Southwest Africa. The appellant alleged that
the appellees' writing infringed an original manuscript he had
drafted and subsequently submitted to a publisher, based on
testimony of the reporters. The court first set forth the general rule:
"Infringement of a literary work... cannot result from the taking
of an idea or a theme, but only from reproduction of the expression
or form in which this idea or theme is found expressed .... 276
272. Id. ("[C]ene simple idle nest pas elle-mime susceptible d'tre protege. . . . [L"auteur
du projet de tlivision] ne seraitfondi d agir en contrefa.on que dans la mesure oil les modalitds
de i'inssion par lui proposde se trouveraient servilement reproduites.").
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Judgment of Jan. 15, 1990, Paris Cour dappel, ler ch. A, 1990 D.S., LR, 67-68.
276. Id. ("La contrefagon en matdre firaire... ne peut risulter de la reprise d'une idle
ou d'un thdme, mais seulement de la reproduction de l'expression ou de laforme dans laquelle cene
idle ou ce thme se trouvent exprimis").
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The court described the expression or form of a literary work as
including: "the arrangement of the subject, the linking together of
situations or scenes, and the original characteristics which give the
work its own physiognomy and its specific traits." '77 General
themes conveyed in the two works, the court underscored,
constituted unprotectable ideas: "Mhe themes portrayed, such as
the description of the meerkats, their life adventures, their
relationships with the men, cannot themselves be
appropriated.., and must be considered as being in the public
domain."278 Such broad themes, the court concluded, could not
be original since they corresponded to true experiences of the
reporters which the appellant could only have learned about second
hand.279 Finally, the court emphasized that while the works might
have shared general themes or ideas, the authors' expression of
such ideas was distinct: "[T]he text of [the appellees'] work
differed essentially from [the appellant's] manuscript in its
conception, spirit, and expression . .. while similar terms or
definitions can be found in the two texts, their use is justified by
the specificity of the situations described .. *,,210 Accordingly,
the court found no infringement.
Unlike its approach in the Galardi case, the court here
specifically separates ideas-the general themes of the work-from
expression, the authors' particular rendering of such themes. The
court's analysis, in fact, looks very much like that of American
courts, delineating a scale of abstraction and refusing protection to
elements dictated by the subject matter.
The detailed approach of the Chavanel case exemplifies how
French courts should address the legal protection of computer
technologies. Applying the idea versus expression distinction,
277. Id. ("la composition du suje, lenchainement des situations ou des scnes, et des
caractiriytiques originales qui donnentd l'oeuvre sa physionomiepropre etses traits spicifiques.").
278. Id. "[Lies thmes traids, comme [a description des meerkats, les pirip ties de leur vie,
leurs rapports avec les hommes, ne sont pas en eux-mdmes susceptibles d'appropriation ... et
doivent itre considiris comme "tant de libre parcours.' ").
279. Id.
280. Id ("[Lie texte de l'ouvrage incriminj diffire essentiellement du manusrit par sa
conception, son esprit et son expression... si des termes ou des ddfinitions semblables peuvent itre
relevis dans les deux textes, leur emploi se trouve justifid par la spdicltcitd des situations ddcrites").
1992 / Originality in Computer Programs and Expert Systems
French courts should relegate to the public domain any aspect of
computer technologies which follows from inherent constraints of
developing functional programs, or from industry-imposed
standards. Such aspects, because they are required by the subject
matter, can never be viewed as incorporating a programmer's
personality. The present approach of French courts-linking
originality to individual creative toil-omits this important analytic
step. French courts, if they apply Pachot's formulation narrowly,
may extend protection to conventional or compulsory elements of
programming.28' To avoid such excessive protection, the French
courts, in accordance with the present trend in American cases as
well as the clear mandate of the EC Directive, must thoughtfully
and systematically distinguish a program's ideas from its original
expression.
IV. DEVELOPING A SYSTEMATIC APPROACH
UNDER AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW
A. Introduction
Determining originality of computer technologies, whether
under American or French law, requires courts to develop a refined
understanding of the precise range of programming expression. The
initial originality requirement under American law, calling for an
author's independent effort, merely provides a check on servile
copying. The creativity requirement, under the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Feist Publications, calls for an additional, albeit
marginal, showing of authorial ingenuity. Neither of these concepts
assists courts in determining precisely which aspects of a
281. As explained above, it remains unclear how courts will apply the Pachot holding. In one
recent case, the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris, invoking the familiar language of Pacho:,
upheld the originality of a series of computer programs developed by the plaintiff. The defendant had
made multiple counterfeit copies. After studying only one of the plaintiffs several programs, the
court noted that it was "the best product of its kind, because of its power and the originality of the
solutions adopted for its functions." Based on its limited analysis, the court concluded broadly that
the plaintiff's work demonstrated a 'personalized effort going beyond the simple application of an
automatic and constraining logic.'" See Judgment of July 8, 1987 (Commande Electronique et autres
v. Teixeira et autres), Paris Trib. gr. inst., correctional chamber, 1989 D.S. 1 3376.
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technology stem from authorial imagination and which are
compelled by utilitarian or other constraints. Rather, American
courts rely on the idea versus expression dichotomy to discern a
technology's protectable and nonprotectable aspects. In particular,
American courts identify a program's function and ask whether
specific attributes of the program are essential to such function.
French courts, by contrast, presently use a single originality
standard to probe computer programs for signs of authorial
personality. Although the French imprint of the personality criterion
may, on the surface, seem stricter than the American independent
effort standard, it probably is equally permissive. Personality, under
the prevailing judicial concept of originality, is linked to an
author's freely made choices. French courts, although they have
referred to constraints of logic, do not appear to recognize all the
ways in which a programmer's expressive freedom may be limited
or eliminated. They also have not explicitly separated idea from
expression in cases pertaining to computer programs. In the
previous section, this article suggested that French courts should
apply the idea versus expression distinction consistently and
address the complete set of constraints which may curtail an
author's possible range of programming expression.
In essence, the task facing jurists in both France and the United
States is to identify all the ways in which programmers' creative
choices may be restricted and formulate rules which account for
these restrictions. To decide whether particular aspects of a
computer program are essential to that program's function or logic,
jurists ideally should comprehend all the limitations programmers
encounter. Although program developers can probably recite a long
list, there are at least four limitations courts should systematically
consider, including (1) requirements of the end user, (2)
requirements of the target hardware, (3) requirements of the target
software, and (4) conventions of computer programming.1 2
Where these constraints compel developers to design program
282. Similar guideposts have been suggested in David Nimmer et al., Analyzing Substantial
Similarity in Computer Software Infringement Cases, 6 CoMPtni LAw., Feb. 1989, 1, 2-4.
1992 / Originality in Computer Programs and Expert Systems
elements in a particular way, courts should treat such elements as
unoriginal ideas and consign them to the public domain.
B. The Four Guidelines
1. Requirements of the End User
Courts should not identify as "expression" elements of a
computer technology required to meet an end user's practical
business or technical needs. Some American courts have already
applied this rule. The Fifth Circuit recognized that several aspects
of a program designed to provide cotton farmers with data on
cotton prices were mandated by "externalities of the cotton
market., 283 Accordingly, the court considered these aspects to be
part of the program's uncopyrightable idea. 2  In Lotus
Development Corp., as desceribed above, the U.S. District Court for
the District of Massachusetts refused protection to the rotated L-
screen display, the computer-generated image of an accounting
spreadsheet which most end users have grown accustomed to
using.285 Likewise, in Manufacturers Technologies, Inc. v. Cams,
Inc.,286 the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut
refused protection to the internal navigation system of a cost-
estimating program which, according to the court, was a
noncopyrightable convention for computers assuring user
comfort.
28 7
An additional, hypothetical application of this rule is as follows.
Suppose a developer designed a program that, interacting with an
existing word processing system and a legal data base such as
LEXIS or JURIS-DATA, could verify the accuracy of and make
necessary corrections in legal citations contained in law review
articles or legal briefs and memoranda. By comparing the names of
283. Plains Cotton Coop. Ass'n v. Goodpasture Computer Serv., 807 F.2d 1256, 1262 & n.4
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821 (1987).
284. rd.
285. 740 F. Supp. at 66.
286. 706 F. Supp. 984 (D. Conn. 1989).
287. Id. at 995.
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cases, statutes, and articles cited in a document to the proper
citations stored in the data base, the program, as a spelling check,
would alert the drafter to citation errors and propose corrections.
Suppose, too, that the citation corrections the program made were
based on the rules published by the Harvard Law Review
Association in A Uniform System of Citation. Since citations in law
journal articles, briefs and memoranda generally must conform to
these rules,2 . this feature of the program would be a requirement
of end users and, therefore, a noncopyrightable idea.
In addition to such user requirements stemming from practical
constraints within individual industries and businesses, courts must
consider user requirements resulting from technological
standardization within the computer industry.8 9 Unlike the case
of conventional literary works, where protection of one author's
particular expression does not usually hinder the creative
production of subsequent authors, protecting aspects of a computer
program which have become industry standards can significantly
circumscribe subsequent development of noninfringing compatible
programs.290
Computer products deviating even marginally from
conventional equipment may fail to attract end users who have
already invested in and attained familiarity with standard
288. See, e.g., 104 HARv. L Rev. ii (1991) ("Footnotes should conform to the 14th edition
of A Uniform System of Citation."); 88 MIcH. L. Re7v. (1990) ("Citations in manuscripts should
follow the form prescribed in A Uniform System of Citation"); 43 STAN. L ReV. (1991) ("The text
and citations of the Review generally conform to A Uniform System of Citation (14th ed. 1986).").
289. Standards are created in at least two ways. De facto standards arise without formal
agreement where, for example, a central government authority or large company makes a particular
choice in technology which other developers subsequently follow to assure compatibility. By contrast,
de jure standards arise where a group of interested parties enter into discussions and then specifically
agree to adopt a standard. See Joseph Farell, Standardization and Intellectual Property, 30
JutIMETRcs J. 35, 39-42 (1989).
290. To understand why the computer industry often prefers standard technologies over new
(and perhaps even better) variants, one need only contemplate why typewriter manufacturers have
never replaced the rather clumsy QWERTRY keyboard with Dvorak's more efficient keyboard or
why car manufacturers have proposed few variants on the familiar H-shaped stick shift design.
Obviously, there are many technologies end users count on exploiting, without having to master new
skills or expend additional resources. To accommodate such "locked-in" users, manufacturers
generally try to assure their goods will comply with existing technological standards. Id. at 47-48.
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technologies.29 For instance, because end users spend significant
time mastering the interfaces of programs they use, they count on
the functional details of such interfaces remaining basically the
same in new or improved computing products.2" Therefore, even
if a developer, in theory, has several choices regarding the design
of a particular interface feature, an industry standard might, as a
practical matter, compel a single plausible choice. Likewise, once
they grow accustomed to writing programs on a computer with
specific operating system software, computer programmers rely on
the developer of an improved operating system to design its
interfaces and specify its functions in substantially the same way
as did the original system. That is, to create an operating system
which will meet the needs of most programmers, the developer is
obliged to include certain standard program features. When a court
determines that such a standard program feature is, in reality,
required for the program to be useful, the court should generally
treat that feature as a nonprotectable idea.
2. Requirements of the Target Hardware
Courts shold treat as nonprotectable ideas any components of
a computer program required for the program to operate properly
in conjunction with particular hardware. Several American courts
have already applied this rule, refusing to protect specific
programming solutions dictated by design standards of particular
hardware. For instance, in Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc.,293
the Ninth Circuit rejected copyright protection for several aspects
of a video game's screen display which, the court determined, were
imposed by technological requirements of the hardware on which
the game programs were to be run.294 Similarly, in Manufacturers
291. Id. See Michael A. Jacobs, Copyright and Compatibility, 30 JVRiMrImcs J. 91 (1989)
(Copyright law should allow for independent creation of compatible computer programs).
292. Moreover, even end users who are acquiring their first computer system may be reluctant
to invest in a system which is incompatible with most existing technologies and which risks
becoming obsolete. See Farell, supra note 289, at 36-39.
293. 862 F.2d 204 (9th Cir. 1988).
294. Id. at 208-09.
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Technologies Inc. v. Cams, Inc., the district court found that
mechanical constraints of Wang hardware compelled the plaintiff
to assign certain screen display functions to particular keyboard
locations.29 These aspects, the court concluded, should not
receive copyright protection.296
Notably, the preamble of the EC Directive sets forth a similar
guideline. The Directive recognizes that, where the purpose of a
computer program is to "communicate and work together with
other components of a computer system and with users," a
particular technology may be necessary to link the program,
computer, and user.297 The Directive states: "[A] logical and
where appropriate physical interconnection and interaction is
required to permit all elements of software and hardware to work
with other software and hardware and with users in all the ways
they are intended to function.' '29 Those aspects of a program
which assure the proper link between software and hardware
elements, the Directive indicates, may be termed "interfaces.' 299
The Directive stresses, finally, that the technology underlying such
interfaces may include noncopyrightable ideas: "[F]or the
avoidance of doubt it has to be made clear that . . . ideas and
principles which underlie any element of a program, including
those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright
under this Directive." 3" Hence, any part of a program required
to achieve the proper interface between such program and the
target computer's hardware and software components would likely
constitute a noncopyrightable idea under the Directive.
295. 706 F. Supp. 984, 995 (1989).
296. Id.
297. Directive, supra note 12, pmbl. "This functional interconnection and interaction," the
Directive explains, "is generally known as Interoperability' ... [that is] the ability to exchange
information and to mutually use the information which has been exchanged." ld
298. Id
299. Id ("Mhe parts of the program which provide for such interconnection and interaction
between elements of software and hardware are generally known as interfaces.").
300. Id
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3. Requirements of the Target Software
Courts should treat components of computer programs
necessitated by requirements of the software with which they will
interface as part of the program's noncopyrightable idea. For a
programmer to achieve compatibility or interoperability with
particular software, he may be required to use source code which
closely resembles that of existing programs. For instance, a
developer designing a word processing program must assure that
the instructions he uses will interface properly with the operating
system of the computer upon which his program will run. An
operating system, in many cases, will only recognize instructions
stated in specific form. For example, the instructions a programmer
uses to tell the operating system when and how to trap key
strokes-that is, to read and process the characters an end user types
into the computer-can be expressed in a limited number of ways.
A programmer may be compelled to adopt an instruction set similar
to one which other developers have previously used to carry out
such trapping function. Such standard instruction sets, if part of
independently created programs, should not be considered aspects
of protectable expression.3"'
Similarly, requisite elements of an otherwise independently
designed operating system should remain in the public domain. A
developer creating an improved operating system must design it to
be compatible with application programs intended to run on similar
predecessor systems. That is, the developer must assure that the
operating system will understand standard instructions issued by the
software which end users customarily employ to communicate with
the prototype operating system. Obviously, an operating system
requiring target programs to utilize an entirely new set of basic
instructions would be of little value, since it would be useful only
for new application programs specially designed to run on it.
301. For a recent case adopting this approach, see Computer Associates Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
775 F. Supp. 544,561 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (Parameter lists andmacros of application programs, required
to be written in a specific form to be readable by the target operating system, were not
copyrightable).
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Accordingly, courts should deem elements of an operating system
program necessary to achieve compatibility with target application
programs as nonprotectable ideas.
4. Conventions of Computer Programming
Courts should treat those aspects of a computer program which
incorporate conventional programming methods and practices as
part of such program's noncopyrightable idea. In the computer
industry, developers have found that certain operations can be
achieved far more efficiently through specific programming
solutions.2 For example, most students of computer science
learn, early on, that there are a limited number of algorithms which
one can use efficiently to sort30 3 a large quantity of data.3°4
Because programmers systematically use the most efficient or best
sorting algorithms, the code instructions they use to implement
such algorithms will necessarily have many similarities. °5
Likewise, programmers often use standard date routines °.3 6 These
are the subroutines0 7 programmers use - in a wordprocessing
program, for instance - to request that the operating system of the
target computer generate the date. Programmers draft date routines
in specific form not only because of technical requirements of the
target operating system, but also because, as a matter of standard
practice, programmers write date routines in a limited number of
302. Several commentators have proposed that, even if there are many ways of carrying out
a certain computer function, there may be some ways which are significantly more efficient and
therefore should not receive copyright protection. See, e.g., Peter S. Mennell, An Analysis of the
Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs, 41 STAN. L REV. 1045, 1053-55 (1989).
303. A simple example of a sorting problem is how to alphabetize a group of names which are
presently in random order. A sorting algorithm would be the set of procedures one could use to solve
the sorting problem.
304. Interview with Mordecai Golin, mathematician and computer scientist, in Paris, France
(May 18, 1991).
305. Id. It should also be noted that the number of efficient programming solutions may be
more limited when a particular programming language is used. If a programmer uses a formal high-
level language, such as Pascal, for instance, he generally can make fewer independent programming
decisions than if he used a less formal language, such as C. Id.
306. Interview with Joan Romejko, computer programmer, in Paris, France (Apr. 19, 1991).
307. Subroutines are blocks of code instructions which programmers use repeatedly in writing
programs.
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ways. Also, programmers almost systematically achieve the
interface ' between programs and printers using a very specific
language, developed by Adobe Corporation called "Postscript."
Although the company claims to hold a copyright in the key words
of Postscript, Adobe permits programmers to use the language
freely, so long as they make appropriate mention of Adobe in the
documentation accompanying their work. Therefore, programmers
customarily use Postscript where instructions regarding printing are
required, employing the same key words of Postscript to achieve
similar functions. Such conventional programming techniques,
which the industry comes to rely on as general practice, should not
be viewed as original expression.
Apparently, no court, either in France or the United States, has
yet applied this rule to determine the copyrightability of a specific
programming technique. However, in cases pertaining to computer
programs, several courts in the United States have applied the so-
called "scenis d faire" doctrine to refuse protection to general
attributes of programs which they found "indispensable or at least
standard" to the central purpose of such programs."' For
instance, in Frybarger v. International Business Machines
Corp.,09 the Ninth Circuit found that similarities between the
litigants' video games stemmed from the fact that they were
indispensable expressions of the basic idea of the games.310 In
Lotus Development Corp., the court referred to the scdnes d faire
doctrine as precedent supporting the merger rule which, in turn, the
court linked to an additional concept it called "obviousness." ' '
308. In Whelan Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Lab., Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1031 (1987). The Third Circuit discussed the scdnes dfaire doctrine as providing
a basis for the court's function versus idea analogy: "Scednes d faire are afforded no protection
because the subject matter represented can be expressed in no other way than through the particular
scdne d faire... This is merely a restatement of the hypothesis... that the purpose or function of
a work or literary device is part of that device's 'idea' (unprotectable portion).- Id, at 1236.
309. 812 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1987).
310. Id. at 529-30.
311. 740 F. Supp. 37, 58-59 (1990). In particular, the court compared the notion of merg-
er-where copyright is refused because there are so few ways of expressing a particular idea-to the
concept of scdnes dfaire where granting a copyright "would give the first author a monopoly on the
commonplace ideas behind the scones dfaire.' Id. at 59 (citing Landsberg v. Scrabble Crossword
Game Players, Inc., 736 F.2d 485, 489 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1037 (1984)).
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The court stated: "When a particular expression goes no farther
than the obvious, it is inseparable from the idea itself. . . . If,
however, the expression of an idea has elements that go beyond all
functional elements of the idea itself, and beyond the obvious...
then those elements of expression . . . are copyrightable.
' 3 12
While the court correctly recognized that computer programs may
include standard elements of expression which should not be
protected, its use of the term "obvious" is ambiguous.
What did Lotus Development Corp. mean when it spoke of
"obviousness"? The court neither defined the term nor explained
it with relevant judicial precedent. For American jurists, the term
would seem to come from patent law. For a work to be patentable,
it must not only be novel and useful, but also non-obvious.313
Specifically, the patent statute refuses a patent to the invention
whose subject matter "would have been obvious at the time of the
invention to a person having ordinary skill in the art."' 314 By
contrast, a work may be copyrighted, according to traditional
doctrine, once, and to the extent, it embodies original expression.
The Copyright Act of 1976 has never codified a nonobviousness
requirement and the courts have not created one. In Lotus
Development Corp., the court's use of the terms "obvious" and
"obviousness" may thus be interpreted as suggesting that computer
programs should be protected under a patent-like rubric whereby
courts would carefully test the obviousness of the technologies
programs incorporate.
More likely, Lotus Development Corp. was simply enjoying an
expansive use of English vocabulary. If so, "obviousness," in the
copyright context, might instead be understood as meaning
"standard" or "common practice in the industry." Under this
interpretation, courts could reject copyright protection for those
312. Id at 58-59.
313. See 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1988); see also Cyclo Floor Mach. Corp. v. Nat'l Housewares, Inc.,
296 F. Supp. 665, 681 (D. Utah 1968) ("Congress has particularized the standard of patentability by
requiring that an invention be endowed with the qualities of novelty, utility and non-obviousness
before being entitled to a legal monopoly.").
314. La Maur, Inc. v. LS. Donaldson Co., 190 F. Supp. 771,781, aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 299 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 815.
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aspects of programming expression which do not stem so much
from authorial imagination as from the "obvious" conventions and
usages of contemporary computer programming.
C. Summary
In sum, when determining what aspects of computer programs
are original and therefore protectable, both French courts and
American courts must apply two basic principles. First, the courts
must examine whether the program truly has its origin with the
author. The work must be the author's own creation, in other
words, not copied. Whereas American courts state this requirement
explicitly, French courts cloak it in the personality concept, stating
that the program must "bear the impress of the author's
personality." Arguably, this difference in terminology is
unimportant where computer programs are the subject matter in
question. Either the program came from the independent intellectual
work of the author in question, or it did not.
Second, after confirming that a developer designed the program
in question without copying protected works, both American and
French courts must ask whether the developer's product embodies
autonomous, creative choices, or merely embraces standard or
imperative programming solutions. The creativity requirement and
idea versus expression dichotomy in American law, and the Cour
de cassation's recent holding in Pachot, link originality to the
imaginative decisions a programmer makes when engineering a
program. Program elements dictated by requirements of the end
user, requirements of the target hardware or software, or
conventions of computer programming cannot embody a
developer's creative expression nor reflect his unique personality.
To encourage programmers to develop innovative programs and
assure that programmers have access to the basic technologies they
need to do this work, courts should systematically deem these
elements unoriginal ideas and decline to protect them.
Part V demonstrates that the guidelines proposed above can
also be used to assess the originality of expert systems, another
fast-evolving computer technology. Expert systems can likely be
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protected under the existing frameworks of copyright and droit
d'auteur. Consistent with the discussion above, the work of jurists
in both systems will be to measure the available range of
expression and identify instances where industry expectations or
technical constraints compel similar or standard programming
solutions.
V. ORIGINALITY IN EXPERT SYSTEMS
UNDER AMERICAN AND FRENCH LAW
A. The Technology
Expert systems are knowledge-based computer programs which
model human expert perception to solve problems in a specialized
area of expertise.315  Examples of expert systems include
programs that help chemists determine the structure of complex
organic molecules, assist physicians performing medical diagnosis,
and direct geologists towards potential mineral deposits. 16 Unlike
conventional software programs which, in general, only tackle
problems and process data reducible to numbers and formulas,
expert systems can engage in conceptual problem-solving, handling
data which are not necessarily translatable into numeric logic.3"7
Whereas conventional software programs, given any data set,
furnish only one solution, expert systems are able to propose
alternate solutions, and attach various certainty levels to such
solutions.318 Also, experts systems can often come to conclusions
where the data available is sketchy or incomplete. 9
Conventional programs are usually unable to solve problems
without perfect information. 2 °
315. See McLellan, Introduction to Artifcial Intelligence and Fxpert Systems, FOOD
TECHNOLOGY, May 1989, at 120-24.
316. See A. GARHA, ARTnMCIAL NTIi. JGNCE: AN INTRODUC'InON 202-09 (1988).
317. See M. VAN HORN, UNDERSTANDwNG EXPERT SYSTEMS 48-49 (1986).
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
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The underlying programming principles used to design expert
systems derive from the discipline of computer science dubbed,
perhaps inaccurately, as "artificial intelligence." 32 ' In spite of the
attention both scientists and fictionists have devoted to a futuristic
world where computers would reason and intuit like humans,
computers have attained only limited intellectual competence.322
However, in their effort to anthropomorphize computers and
develop so-called "intelligent machines," computer scientists have
made important advances in understanding how knowledge can be
structured, analyzed, and interpreted by computers. Expert systems,
perhaps the most important by-product of this research, are now
commercially available as applications for standard hardware and
software environments, including many which run on personal
computers.323
Although they might be described generically as a type of
computer program, expert systems are truly a composite of several
technologies. 324 Every expert system includes (1) a knowledge
321. "Artificial intelligence" is a catch-all term which encompasses diverse areas of research
including mathematics, software engineering, linguistics, and psychology. Despite its broad relevance,
artificial intelligence can be defined more narrowly as involving two basic intellectual undertakings:
(1) the theoretical study of how the human mind works (using machine simulations), and (2) the
study of useful applications, wherein computers are programmed to execute functions generally
carried out by humans. See Schank, What Is A, Anyway?, in Tim FOUNDATIONS OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELuGENCE: A SOURCEBOOK 3-13 (Derek Partridge & Yorick Wilks eds. 1990). Part V is
concerned with expert systems, an example of a useful application of artificial intelligence.
322. Although some scholars still contend that computers will ultimately be able to think in the
same way humans do, the present literature indicates that computers can act intelligently only insofar
as they are programmed to do so. Furthermore, the literature suggests significant gaps between the
miraculous competencies of the human brain and the more humble achievements of computers.
Computers lack the capacity to act consciously, use common sense, create ideas of their own, explain
themselves and learn from experience. Computers provide "intelligent" solutions simply by
manipulating symbols in the ways humans program them to do so. See Winograd, Thinking
Machines: Can There Be? Are We?, in THE FouNDAIoNs OF ARTIICIAL INT=ENCE: A
SOURCEBOOK, supra note 321, at 167-89 ("Computers, with their foundations of cold logic, can
never be creative or insightful or possess real judgment. No matter how competent they appear, they
do not have the genuine intentionality that is the heart of human understanding."); see also Gladwell,
Thinking Like Humans, 29 APPLMD OPnIcs, Aug. 10, 1990, at 3326-27; ROGER PENROSE, THE
EMPEROR'S NEw MmD: CONCERNING COMPurERs, MINDS, AND Ti-E LAws OF PHYSICS 1-466 (6th
ed. 1989); WILUAM A. TAYLOR, WHAT EVERY ENGINEER SHOULD KNow ABOuT AI 1-24 (1988).
323. See Egol, Erpert Systems Come to the Desktop, CHEMICAL ENGINERIo, Mar. 1990, at
157 ("[Expert systems have moved into the mainstream of the business environment....").
324. See VIVANr Er AL., supra note 11, at 803-05.
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base which stores the factual expertise the system accesses when
solving problems, (2) an inference engine, a program which infers
or reasons about how and when the knowledge base will be used,
and (3) a natural-language interface which communicates between
the system and the user.3' Notably, a knowledge base can
provide the basis for several separate expert systems.326 By
modifying the structure of the inference engine, the same
knowledge base can be used to solve different types of problems.
Similarly, in some cases, a carefully designed inference engine can
be linked to different knowledge bases in order to execute similar
operations upon distinct data.327
Whereas conventional programs are essentially comprised of
algorithms-rigid, systematic procedures which, if followed, assure
a specific solution or result-the basic building blocks of expert
systems are heuristics. Heuristics, in essence, are rules of
thumb.328 They represent the empirical knowledge of an expert
as summarized by simple rules.329 The classic formulation of a
heuristic is an "if... then" rule.3 0 For instance, a heuristic in
a weather-predicting expert system might read: "IF : (1) nimbus
cloud formation, (2) wind above 10 knots, (3) wind from
northwest, (4) barometric pressure 29.85, falling, THEN: tomorrow
there will be a 75% chance of rain.' 331  As this (fictional)
325. VAN HoRN, supra note 317, at 97.
326. McLellan, supra note 315, at 121.
327. Id.
328. See Summers, ES: A Public Domain Expert System, BYTg, Oct. 1990, at 282-92.
329. Algorithms and heuristics represent separate ways of representing knowledge.
Conventional programs, using algorithms, represent knowledge in procedural form, whereas expert
systems, using heuristics, rely on declarative form. Jacques Pitrat, a French computer scientist,
demonstrates this distinction by comparing a declarative statement ofa rule ofFrench grammar-"Ihe
article must agree with the gender and quantity of the noun"-with a procedural statement: "when
one comes upon a noun, one must observe the article attached; one then verifies that the gender of
the article is the same as the gender of the noun, and then that the quantity of the article is the same
as the quantity of the noun." See IvAT r AT., supra note 11, at 806 (citing Pitrat, La Naissance
de lIntelligence Artificielle, 16 LA RECHERcHE 1130, 1140-41 (1985)). Because an expert system
includes an inference engine pre-programmed to manipulate whatever factual rules are contained in
the knowledge base, factual rules can later be added to the base in simple declarative form. A
conventional computer program, by contrast, would have to be modified with additional procedures.
Id.
330. VAN HoRN, supra note 317, at 27-28.
331. Id. at 55-75.
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example demonstrates, heuristics do not reach firm, certain
conclusions the way algorithms do. Rather, heuristics often reach
conclusions qualified by a level of probability. The probability
associated with a heuristic is generally termed a "certainty factor"
or "confidence factor." 3
32
Once an appropriate problem for an expert system has been
identified,333 the task of developing the system involves two
further steps. The first step is knowledge acquisition or transfer of
expertise.33' This involves translating the knowledge of a human
expert into heuristics comprehensible to the target computer.
Because this process is generally achieved through a computer
engineer's interviews with the qualified expert, it is also referred
to as "knowledge engineering. ' 335 The engineer's primary task
is to condense the expert's knowledge into rules for the system's
knowledge base and inference engine. Rules for the knowledge
base concern the basic facts and relationships within the expert
domain.336 Inference rules involve the ways in which the
knowledge rules must be manipulated in order to solve a
problem.337  Thus, through discussions with the expert, the
engineer must not only transform the expert's knowledge into rules,
but also determine whether particular rules should be assigned to
the knowledge base or the inference engine.
The second step of developing the system is programming. An
expert system is generally programmed using an AI language such
as LISP, PROLOG, or C.338 These languages are based on
332. Certainty factors are often converted into numeric values and arranged along a continuum.
For instance, one author puts forth the following example: 1.0 - absolutely true, .75 - almost
certainly true, .50 = reasonably true, .25 - somewhat true, 0 - unknown, -0.25 - somewhat false, -
0.75 - almost certainly false, - 1.0 - absolutely false. See Summers, supra note 328, at 290.
333. Expert systems cannot be used in every domain. They are only effective at solving
problems human experts themselves can resolve and for which experts can provide many relevant
examples. Expert systems are generally inappropriate to handle problems requiring absolute answers.
In such instances, conventional algorithmic programs may be more suitable. See VAN HORN, supra
note 317, at 55-75; McLellan, supra note 315, at 121.
334. GARNHAM, supra note 316, at 200.
335. TAYLoR, supra note 322, at 155.
336. VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 92.
337. Id.
338. McLellan, supra note 315, at 121.
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"predicate logic" which is more versatile and resilient than the
propositional logic upon which conventional programming is
generally based.339 In short, propositional logic only permits the
computer to compare elements which are either true or false, or
which can be reduced to numbers or formulas.?4 That is,
propositional logic assesses whether an entire statement or
proposition, such as "Descartes was French" or "1 + 3 = 4," is
true or false. The propositions are compared and measured with a
limited number of logical operators which are ultimately processed
by the computer through mathematic calculations. Predicate logic,
by contrast, permits the computer to interpret and perform
operations upon specific terms within a logical statement or
proposition.3"
Perhaps the best way to understand predicate logic is to identify
the component parts of a heuristic." For instance, in an expert
system designed to help diagnose disease, a hypothetical heuristic
might be "IF the catscan shows myelin damage, THEN the
patient's disease is multiple sclerosis." The second half of this
statement can be broken down as follows:
The patient's / disease I is I multiple sclerosis.
Object Attribute Predicate Value
As this diagram shows, the predicate is the action word or
operational term of the IF - THEN statementM3 The object is the
physical thing or concept which constitutes the subject or context
of the inquiry.' The attribute is some characteristic about the
object, and the value is an assessment or specification of the
attribute.4 5 In languages such as LISP or PROLOG, the predicate
339. See MiKE SHAuRLES Hr AL., CoMwurEtm AND THouoHr. A PRACTICAL INTRODUCTION
TO ARTI'ICIAL INTElUomc 12 (1989); see also, VAN HoRN, supra note 317, at 137-43.
340. VAN HoRN, supra note 317, at 137-43.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. VAN HoRN, supra note 317, at 137-43.
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states the relationship between the object, attribute, and value. In
an expert system, the predicate instructs the computer how to treat
the object, attribute, and value. Objects, attributes, and values, in
reality, are variables the computer merely manipulates as symbols
and does not understand. 6 Because languages using predicate
logic can express many relationships among such variables, they
enable the computer to execute a variety of complex operations
upon data.
The inference engine is the program in an expert system which,
mediating between the user and the knowledge base, determines
how objects, attributes, and values will be employed to solve the
user's problem. Every inference engine includes two principal
components: (1) a rule control structure that dictates which rule
will be addressed next or what additional facts should be requested
from the user, and (2) a rule interpreter which (a) examines
whether conditions expressed in the rules have been satisfied by
facts provided by the knowledge base, and (b) adds facts necessary
to draw inferences. 7
To determine the order in which inferences are made, the rule
control structure uses two strategies. The first strategy pertains to
the direction of the reasoning or inferencing process. In so-called
"backward-chaining" systems, the inference engine begins with a
conclusion or goal, and then tests it against the data received."
Systems using such goal driven or top-down reasoning, usually
produce a limited number of ultimate conclusions. 9 Inference
engines implementing a forward-chaining approach, by contrast,
take the data provided and search through the knowledge base for
relevant rules which might lead to a solution.35 This approach,
also termed "data-driven" or "bottom-up" reasoning, generally
346. Id.
347. TAYLOR, supra note 322, at 154-56; McLeIlan, supra note 315, at 121-22; Summers, supra
note 328, at 290; VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 102-10.
348. TAYLOR,supra note 322, at 154-56; McLellan, supra note 315, at 121-22; Summerssupra
note 328, at 290; VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 102-10.
349. TAYLOR, supra note 322, at 154-56; McLellan, supra note 315, at 121-22; Summers, supra
note 328, at 290; VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 102-10.
350. TAYLOR, supra note 322, at 154-56; McLellan, supra note 315, at 121-22; Summers, supra
note 328, at 290; VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 102-10.
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leads to a greater number of conclusions.351 A simple illustration
of the difference between forward and backward chaining is as
follows. Suppose a system included the heuristic "if Q, then Z."
Fact Q would be the premise of the rule, and Z the conclusion. If
a backward-chaining expert system were trying to conclude Z, then
it would conduct a search for fact Q, since Q would enable it to
conclude Z. A forward-chaining system, if and when it learned fact
Q, would automatically conclude Z, since fact Q infers that Z is
true.352 A real-life example of a backward-chaining expert system
is Mycin, which assists physicians in diagnosing infectious blood
disease. 3 Mycin, after developing a hypothesis of what a
patient's illness may be, moves backward through the rules in the
knowledge base to test its hypothesis.3 54 An example of an
existing forward-chaining system is Dendral which helps chemists
identify chemical compounds.355 Dendral identifies compounds by
taking all the facts about the unknown substance initially entered
by the user and moving forward through the rules to find a
chemical structure which matches the data.35 6
The second strategy inference engines use to control how an
expert system reasons involves "depth of search," i.e., how far the
system will search in the knowledge base before requesting
additional information from the user. In a depth-first system, the
inference engine requests information in small chunks, only
requesting the data it needs for each subsequent phase of its search.
Such a system establishes research sub-goals easily, and thus asks
for data a little at a time. In a breadth-first system, by contrast, the
inference engine requests much information from the start, moving
forward to deeper research sub-goals reluctantly.
351. TAYLOR,supra note 322, at 154-56; McLe~lansupra note 315, at 121-22; Summers, supra
note 328, at 290; VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 102-10.
352. See TAYLOR, supra note 322, at 155.
353. VAN HORN, supra note 317, at 34.
354. Id at 107.
355. Id at 4346.
356. Id. at 104-05.
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B. Determining the Originality of Expert Systems Under
American and French Law
1. Introduction
Under both American and French law, expert systems must be
analyzed as a composite of three separate technologies: (1) the
knowledge base, (2) the inference engine, and (3) the user
interface. Since analyzing the originality of an expert system's user
interface raises issues which differ little from those discussed
above, the present section focuses on the originality of an expert
system's knowledge base and inference engine. Because the same
knowledge base can be associated with different inference engines
and the same inference engine can be used to manipulate data in
different knowledge bases, courts will likely be required to assess
the originality of these two technologies separately. Indeed, in
addition to selling prepackaged expert systems, developers can
market knowledge bases and inference engines as distinct products.
Rather than treating expert systems as a single copyrightable
computer program, therefore, this section will examine them as
embodying separate copyrightable components.
2. Assessing Originality in Knowledge Bases
Knowledge bases, like data bases, can probably be copyrighted
as literary works under the Copyright Act of 1976.357 In
particular, knowledge bases may be categorized as copyrightable
compilations.358 Congress defined a compilation as: "a work
357. As discussed above, the statutory definition of "literary works" is broad, including
.. verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, regardless of the nature of the material objects... in which
they are embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). HR. 1476, supra note 88, at 54 (This defimition
encompasses both computer programs and data bases); see NIMMER, supra note 52, § 2.04[C], at 2-
43.
358. 17 U.S.C. § 103(a) (The "subject matter of copyright... includes compilations.").
Notably, the author of a compilation obtains protection only for his creative contribution to the work,
not for the preexisting data he incorporates into it. See § 103(b) ("The copyright in a
compilation... extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished
from the preexisting material employed in the work, and does not imply any exclusive right in the
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formed by the collection and assembling of preexisting materials
and of data that are selected, coordinated, or arranged in such a
way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work
of authorship." '359 While no U.S. court has yet settled the issue,
Nimmer on Contracts suggests that data bases may be protected as
compilations.3' 6 Similarly, a knowledge base, which stores the
factual rules a knowledge engineer collects through interviews with
an expert, can be characterized as a "collection" or "assembling"
of "preexisting material" or "data" within the statute's meaning.
As the Copyright Act itself indicates, not all collections of
preexisting material or data are necessarily copyrightable
compilations. To be copyrighted, such collection must be put
together in such a manner that "the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship., 361 In other words, the
work must be "original," an author's independent intellectual
creation. 2 Moreover, although compilations as a whole may be
copyrighted, the ideas or facts they contain, whose origin cannot be
attributed to an act of authorship, can never be original and thus
fall beyond copyright's ambit.363
American courts determine the originality of compilations under
two theories.3 " The first theory links the originality of a
compilation to the work an author invests in developing it.365
Dubbed by jurists as the "sweat of the brow" or "industrious
collection" doctrine, this follows from John Locke's theory of
property whereby a person obtains a property interest in something
he did not previously own through the work he commits to
preexisting materiaL").
359. See § 101.
360. See NiAMnn, supra note 52, § 2.04[B], at 2-41, § 2.04[C, at 2-43.
361. Id.
362. See, e.g., West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219,1223-24 (8th Cir.
1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1070 (1987) (An arrangement of preexisting materials may qualify for
copyright protection as an "independently produced work of intellectual creation").
363. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Sere. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282 (1991).
364. See Ginsburg, supra note 77, at 1893-97; see also, lane C. Ginsburg, U.S. National
Report, in LINFoRMAT1QUE Er LE DRorr DAuTEUR 370-72 (1990).
365. Ginsburg, supra note 77, at 1893-97.
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collecting or creating it."' Thus, just as a court might find a
computer program original because it reflects an author's
independent effort, a court might deem a compilation original when
it demonstrates a sufficient amount of authorial labor or "sweat of
the author's brow."
Of course, this theory only assists the legal analyst in making
the threshold determination of originality, that is, whether the
compilation owes its origin to the author, or is copied. The analyst
still must inquire whether the work embodies original expression.
Even a compiler's most arduous toil might yield a banal
compendium of ideas, lacking the requisite modicum of original
authorship. This was among the recent lessons of the Supreme
Court in Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service
Company.3 67 In the Court's view, the sweat-of-the-brow doctrine,
by associating originality with the work compilers expend rather
than with the authorship they contribute in selecting and arranging
material creatively, "eschew[s] the most fundamental axiom of
copyright law-that no one may copyright facts or ideas."368 The
Court concluded: "[O]riginality, not 'sweat of the brow,' is the
touchstone of copyright protection in... fact-based works." '369
The second theory links the originality of a compilation to the
choices an author makes in collecting and laying out the data the
compilation contains. To the extent the selection, coordination, and
arrangement of data reflects an author's subjective judgment, the
theory goes, the resulting compilation will be original.37 ° In Feist
Publicaitons, Inc., the Supreme Court concluded that the statutory
definition of "compilation" solely supports this second theory of
originality. The Court explained:
Not every selection, coordination, or arrangement will past
muster. This is plain from the statute. It states that, to merit
366. Feist Pubications, Inc., II1 S. Ct. at 1291; Ginsburg, supra note 77, at 1883; Pamela
Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction
in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365, 369 (1989).
367. See supra note 126 (stating the facts of the Feist case).
368. 111 S. Ct. at 1291.
369. Id at 1295.
370. Ginsburg, supra note 77, at 1896 (citing Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc.,
663 F. Supp. 214 (D. Kan. 1987), affid without opinion. 916 F2d 718 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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protection, the facts must be selected, coordinated, or
arranged 'in such a way' as to render the work as a whole
original. This implies that some 'ways' will trigger
copyright, but that others will not.37'
Moreover, the court stressed, compilers must show at least a small
amount of creativity in their work. The court stated: "[S]election
and arrangement of facts cannot be so mechanical or routine as to
require no creativity whatsoever. The standard of originality is low,
but it does exist."' 372 Following this reasoning, American courts
likely will not recognize original expression in an author's
compilation if the author has adhered to some standard or
automatic system of selecting, coordinating, and arranging the
information the compilation contains.
French jurists have also recognized that not all independently
created compilations will necessarily be original. Although the Law
of 1957 does not specifically include compilations in its list of
protectable oeuvres de l'esprit, it states that authors of anthologies
and collections of works will receive the Law's protection. In
particular, article 4 of the Law of 1957 states:
Authors of translations, adaptations, transformations, or
arrangements of oeuvres de l'esprit benefit from the
protection provided by the present law, without prejudice to
the rights of the author of the original work. This applies
also for authors of anthologies or collections of diverse
works which, by the choice and arrangement of the
materials, constitute intellectual creations."
Because this provision specifically protects anthologies and
collections, and because the useful purpose of an author's work
does not affect whether it may be protected under the Law of
371. 111 S. Ct. at 1294.
372. Id. at 1296.
373. Law of 1957, art. 4 ("Les auteurs de traduction. d'adaptations, transformations ou
arrangements des oeuvres de lesprit jouissent de la protection institute par la prdsente lo, sans
prijudice des drofts de l'auteur de l'oeuvre originale. I en est de mime des auteurs d'anthologies
ou recueils d'oeuvres diverses qu4 par le choix et la disposidon des mat re; constituent des
criations intellectuelles.).
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1957,374 jurists in France have concluded that compilations too
are protectable oeuvres de l'esprit.3"
Moreover, jurists have determined that data bases, as a specific
kind of compilation, constitute protectable subject matter under the
Law of 1957. In 1987, in the noted Socidt6Microfor v. S.A.R.L. (Le
Monde) decision,376 the Cour de cassation overruled an appellate
decision which had refused protection to a data base under the Law
of 1957.377 The Cour de cassation held that the appellant's work,
a computerized data base providing references to articles on current
topics of interest, was a protectable work of information under
article 41 of the Law. 378  Article 41, by allowing subsequent
authors to refer to prior works with short quotations, creates an
374. See supra note 189 and accompanying text (quoting Law of 1957, art. 2); see also supra
notes 193-201 and accompanying text.
375. Lucas, supra note 235, Fase. 303-1, at 11.
376. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1987, Cass. ass. plan., 1988 J.CP. I No. 20932 report by X. Nicot
and note by C. Colombet.
377. The facts and procedural history of the case are as follows. Microfor, the appellant,
developed a computerized data base designed to assist in the research of current events. The data base
contained references to diverse French journals and newspapers, including references to Le Monde
and Le Monde Diplomatique, works published by the appellee. Each reference included the title of
the article, the author's name, the publication in which the article appeared, and the article's
bibliographical reference. Also, for most references, the data base provided an associated "descriptive
summary" (risumisgnalltique) providing highlights of the primary source material. When Microfor
first approached Le Monde regarding the data base, La Monde suggested the two companies develop
a joint project. Microfor ignored Le Monde's proposal and instead made its data base available to the
public. In 1981, La Monde initiated a suit before the Tribunal de grande instance of Paris, claiming
that Microfor's use of original titles from Le Monde's publications constituted both copyright
infringement and unfair competition. The Tribunal de grande instance rejected the unfair competition
claim. However, the court held that Microfor's index references constituted partial copying of Le
Monde's original work which, absent La Monde's prior consent, was impermissible under the Law
of 1957. After the Cour d'appel of Paris confirmed this decision in 1982, the Cour de cassation's
Premidre chambre civile found several errors in the appellate court's reasoning, and returned the case
to the Cour d'appel to be heard by a new panel. In 1986, the Cour d'appel again held for Le Monde.
Subsequently, Microfor alleged that the Cour d'appel had again decided incorrectly on several
questions of law. Accordingly, in 1987, the Plenary Assembly of the Cour de cassation accepted
jurisdiction and rendered a final decision. Id.
378. "When the work has been disclosed, the author may not prohibit... (3) Provided that
the author's name and source are clearly indicated: [a]nalyses and short quotations justified by the
critical, polemical, pedagogic, scientific or informational character of the work in which they are
incorporated .... .- Law of 1957, art. 41 ("Lorsque l'oeuvre a dtd divulgde, Pauteur ne peut
interdire ... (3) Sous reserve que soient indiqus clairement le non; de l'auteur et la source: [1Jes
analyses et courtes citationsjustfldes par le caractdre critique, polimique, pidagogique, scientifique
ou d'information de l'oeuvre d laquelle elles sont incorpordes . .
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exception to the general rule, set forth in article 40, which forbids
unconsented copying of an author's original writing.379 The court
stated: "[W]hen the work has been disclosed, the author cannot
prohibit short quotations justified by the informational character of
the work in which they are incorporated, so long as the name of
the author and the source are clearly indicated. ' 380 The court
stressed that Microfor had properly attributed the source and
authorship of the articles it cited and had only used brief quotations
in summarizing them. According to the court, Microfor had not
copied so much content from the primary sources that people
would rely on Microfor's summaries instead of reading the actual
primary sources.381 The court concluded that Microfor's limited
copying was proper and that the excerpts contained in Microfor's
data base, taken as a whole, constituted a protectable work of
information under the Law of 1957.382
Notably, the court conceded protection for Microfor's data base
without considering the amount of authorship entailed in its
creation or analyzing whether Microfor's work included any
original expression. The court did not discuss, for instance, whether
Microfor's data base reflected authorial personality or an
independent intellectual effort. Rather, the Cour de cassation
appeared to conclude that works of information such as Miecrofor's
data base are protectable per se, so long as they include only
minimal excerpts from the original works to which they refer.
However, in the 1989 SARL les Publications pour l'Expansion
Industrielle v. S.A. Coprosa decision,383 the Cour de cassation
379. Law of 1957, art. 40, 11 ("Any integral or partial performance or reproduction executed
without the consent of the author or of his successors in interest or heirs is illegal." ("Toute
reprisentation or reproduction intigrale oupartiellefaite sans le consentement de l'auteur ou de ses
ayants droit ou ayants cause est illcie.")).
380. Judgment of Oct. 30, 1987, Cass. ass. pldn., 1988 J.C.P. II No. 20932 report by X. Nicot
and note by C. Colombet ("[Llorsque l'oeuvre a lt divulgule, l'auteur ne peut interdire, sous
rdserve que solent indiquds clairement le nom d Pauteur et la source, courtes citations justifides par
le caractdre d'information de l'oeuvre d laquelle elks sont incorporles.").
381. Id. ("Mhe 'summaries' only constituted short quotations from the work which did not
spare the reader from relying on such work.. .- ("[Lies 'risumis' constituds uniquement de courtes
citations de l'oeuvre ne dispensant pas le lecteur de recourir d cell-ci ..
382. Id ("[Clene ensemble avait le caractire d'une oeuvre d'information ....
383. Judgment of May 2, 1989, Cass. civ. Ire, 1990 J.C.P. H 21392 note A. Lucas.
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revived originality as the essential criterion of protection for works
of information, finding error in a lower court's decision which had
failed to identify specifically the original elements in a compilation.
The work in question was a flow chart published in a trade journal,
which diagrammed the world's principal automobile companies.
The Cour d'appel of Paris had decided that the appellant's work
was original because of "the research effort [the appellant
expended] to assemble the information" and because of "the new
arrangement through which the appellant presented such
information. ' 38 4 The Cour de cassation rejected the Cour
d'appel's holding, stating that a compilation of information "is not
protected in and of itself." ' In particular, the court concluded
that the lower court "did not specify in what way the text or the
graphic form of [the appellant's] publication comprised an author's
intellectual contribution characterizing an original creation.9 38 6
By reproaching the lower court for not having indicated precisely
what aspects of the appellant's work rendered it original, the Cour
de cassation underscored that French courts may not protect a
compilation automatically. Rather, the courts must clearly identify
those elements of the work which evidence original authorial
expression.
Although S.A. Coprosa clearly rejected the reasoning of the
Cour d'appel of Paris linking originality to the compiler's research
effort and novel presentation of information, the Cour de cassation
did not explain what originality actually means where a
compilation of information is the work in question. Presumably, the
analysis French courts use to assess the originality of works of
information-such as compilations, data bases, or knowledge bases
in an expert system-should follow the same principles the courts
use to determine the originality of similar works of low authorship,
such as computer programs. As a general rule, therefore, the courts
384. Id. ("[L]effortde recherchepourriunireurs dilments etde la composition nouvelle sous
laquelle Us ont drd prisent&s. ...
385. Id.
386. Id. ("[UJn travail de compilation dinformations n'est pas protgd en soi... Parrit ne
prdcise pas en quoi le texte ou la forme graphique de cette publication comporterait un apport
intellectuel de lauteur caractdrisant une crdation originale.").
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should measure the original authorship in a compilation, following
the rationale of the Pachot decision, by identifying the creative
choices an author has made in developing it."87 The language of
article 4 of the Law of 1957 supports this approach, indicating that
the "choice and arrangement" of the materials in an anthology or
collection determine whether it is a protectable "intellectual
creation." '388 Moreover, the courts should refuse protection to
"ideas" or "facts" contained in a work of information. 89 Like
American courts, French courts should analyze whether the author
was able to select, arrange, and present the information in a variety
of ways, or whether external constraints required the author to
execute his work in a specific way.
The range of expression available to the author of an expert
system's knowledge base may be limited in several ways. In
addition to technical constraints imposed by the hardware and
software technologies with which a knowledge base will
interface,390 end user requirements and constraints imposed by the
target system's inference engine may narrow the author's
opportunities for creation. End user requirements circumscribe the
author's expressive range in at least two ways. First, many domains
have a standard way of organizing information. The developer of
a knowledge base may find it necessary to arrange and coordinate
data in conformity with such an end user convention. For instance,
a knowledge base containing detailed information on the chemical
elements-such as their atomic numbers, crystal structures, boiling
point, melting point, and density-might be organized in conformity
with the Periodic Table of the Elements.391 A knowledge base
storing facts regarding the peculiar traits of human chromosome
pairs might, by necessity, include twenty-three consecutively-
387. See Judgment of Mar. 7, 1986 (Socidt6 Babolat Maillot Witt v. Pachot), Cass. ass. pl6n.,
1986 J.C.P. I1, No. 14713 (83-10.477) and 1986 J.C.P. Il, No. 20631 note Mousseruon, Teyssi6, and
Vivant, 1986 J.C.P. No. 15791 obs. Vivant and Lucas, D. 1986, 405, concl. Cabannes and note
Edelman.
388. See supra note 373.
389. See supra notes 265-80 and accompanying text.
390. Because these hardware and software constraints differ little from those considered in Part
IV, Part V will not discuss them further.
391. See RANDOM HousE COLEE DICTIONARY 428 (rev. ed. 1982).
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ordered data structures. A knowledge base with information
intended to help ambulance drivers find the quickest route to a
given location might require an alphabetized list of street names or
a standard map drawn to scale. Where a developer has arranged
data according to such a user convention, the court should not
protect the resulting arrangement since it is not the product of the
developer's creative decisions, and thus does not constitute original
expression under either French or American law.
Second, courts generally should refuse to protect the exhaustive
knowledge base, since its developer usually will not have exercised
creative judgment in selecting data from the expert's store of
knowledge. For instance, in an expert system pertaining to medical
diagnosis, the knowledge engineer might not be able to exercise
discrimination in selecting which rules of diagnosis to add into the
knowledge base. The expert and engineer would probably try to
include every relevant fact rather than select facts according to
subjective criteria. Similarly, an expert system designed to assist
brokers making investment decisions might include all information
about the stock market the expert could possibly produce. The
knowledge engineer, in that case, would not choose creatively from
the expert's repertory of knowledge, but would simply amass all
available information. Although creators of exhaustive data bases
previously may have received protection for the independent effort
or "sweat of the brow" they expended, the Supreme Court's
outlook in Feist Publications, Inc. and the Cour de cassation's
approach in S.A. Coprosa suggest this is no longer appropriate.
Accordingly, courts in the United States and France should
probably deem an engineer's decision to create an exhaustive
knowledge base an unprotectable idea and disallow protection
absent other evidence of the engineer's creative arrangement or
organization of data.
Besides designing a knowledge base to meet such end user
requirements, the knowledge engineer may structure a knowledge
base specifically to satisfy technical requirements of the inference
engine with which it will interface. In particular, the programmer
may have to place the knowledge base rules in an arbitrary order
so that the inference engine can manipulate them according to its
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own rule control structure and rule interpreter. The order in which
knowledge rules are examined, the direction of the inferencing
process, and the "depth of search" are all generally governed by
the inference engine. Therefore, a knowledge engineer designing a
knowledge base for use with a particular inference engine may lack
the freedom to be creative or exercise subjective judgment in
arranging the data. He may be required to arrange the objects,
attributes, and values in a highly structured way so that the
predicate operators, contained in the inference engine, can gain
efficient access to them. Where rules in a knowledge base are
organized specifically to meet technical requirements of an
associated inference engine, the resulting arrangement probably
should not be copyrighted since it would not embody authorial
expression.
3. Assessing Originality in Inference Engines
Under American law, the originality of an inference engine may
be determined pursuant to many of the same principles governing
the originality of conventional computer programs. Indeed,
inference engines fall squarely within the statutory definition of
"computer program." The Copyright Act of 1976 states: "A
'computer program' is a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain
result." 392 Although the heuristic programming languages used
to develop inference engines are based on predicate logic and thus
do not use procedures to instruct the computer in the same way
algorithm-based languages do, they certainly involve statements and
instructions a computer uses to produce a specific result. Therefore,
inference engines may be classified as computer programs within
the meaning of the Copyright Act, and copyrighted as literary
works under settled American case law analogizing programs to
literary works.
393
392. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
393. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text.
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Similarly, inference engines may be classified as "software"
and as protectable oeuvres de l'esprit under France's Laws of 1957
and 1985. As discussed above, neither the Law of 1957 nor the
Law of 1985 defines "software." 3" Based on technical
definitions and on a definition included in an administrative
decree, 95 most legal scholars agree, nonetheless, that inference
engines are software within the statutory meaning of that term. 96
However, some theorists contend that courts should classify expert
systems as "software" and treat inference engines and knowledge
bases as component parts of such software.3" Under this
approach, the Law of 1985 would be applicable to the entire expert
system. Yet, because an expert system truly contains separate
protectable components, most jurists have aptly concluded that
legal protection of "non-software" components, such as the
knowledge base, should be governed by the Law of 1957, whereas
the inference engine, truly a separate computer program, should be
treated as software under the Laws of 1957 and 1985.39s
Because inference engines may be sensibly categorized as
"computer programs" under American law and as "software"
under French law, courts may determine whether they are original
based on the same doctrinal guideposts the courts use to analyze
conventional computer programs. In other words, the courts must
first confirm that the inference engine is the product of a
developer's independent creative efforts, and then examine the
work closely to determine which aspects constitute ideas, and
which protectable expression. In particular, the courts must
carefully distinguish facets of the inference engine embodying the
developer's creative programming decisions from those necessitated
by external requirements.
394. See supra note 209 and accompanying text.
395. See supra note 209.
396. Id. at 803-05; see Bourcier et al., Interactions des Aspects Juridiques et des Aspects
Techniques des Systimes Experts, 25 CAXmS LAMY DU DROrT DE L'INotMxiQU, Apr. 1991, at
1,1-4.
397. Vl T r AL, supra note 11, at 803-05 (citing C. BE RAD, LX srATt DES SySTm-
E(PERTS: DES LOGICMI.S SPItFIQUES (1990)).
398. Id.
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The range of expression available to the developer of an
inference engine is limited by many of the same constraints which
affect conventional programming expression. First, requirements of
the end user may compel the developer of an inference engine to
design the program in a specific way. In particular, practical or
technical requirements of end users may lead the developer to
employ a certain kind of rule control structure or rule interpreter.
For instance, an expert system designed to assist military pilots in
firing missiles at enemy targets might require an inference engine
which uses a "data driven," forward-chaining inferencing strategy.
Based on information fed into it (and on the rules contained in its
knowledge base), the system would conclude when and where the
missiles should be fired. The developer's decision to use that
crucial inferencing strategy, since it is dictated by an external
constraint, probably would not constitute protectable expression.
Likewise, our hypothetical missile firing system might require a
feature wherein, when certain attributes and values were presented
to the inference engine, the inference engine would automatically
send a warning to the user. If a court subsequently decided such a
warning capacity was a necessary feature of any missile firing
expert system, the court should treat the inferencing rules used to
achieve that feature as unprotectable ideas.
Second, because the inference engine must be compatible with
the knowledge base with which it will interface, it may contain
standard code instructions governing how data in the knowledge
base will be located and processed. As stated above, developers
may create a variety of inference engines to operate in conjunction
with the same knowledge base. For instance, several inference
engines might be designed for use with a knowledge base storing
information on meteorological patterns. One inference engine might
be designed to make general weather predictions for public
dissemination, while a second inference engine might be engineered
to provide highly technical information to pilots flying airplanes.
The reasoning process, depth of search, and other inferencing
strategies employed by these programs might be very different. The
programmers implementing these strategies might therefore make
numerous creative decisions regarding precisely how data in the
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target knowledge base should be utilized. However, the developers
would also have to use certain standard instructions to gain access
to information stored in the knowledge base. Just as most
dictionaries require readers to use a standard technique to find the
definition of an unknown word, many knowledge bases may
require an inference engine's search inquiries to adhere to a
specific form. Since such standard search inquiries result from
technical constraints of the target knowledge base rather than from
a developer's creative programming decisions, courts should treat
the code instructions used to implement them as nonprotectable
ideas.
Finally, courts should deny protection to components of an
inference engine included to meet technical requirements of the
target hardware or software environments with which the program
will interface. Developers may often design an inference engine to
be employed in settings where end users already possess a
specialized computer system. For example, a developer designing
an expert system to help attorneys formulate litigation strategies
might want to assure compatibility with the software and hardware
products used most often by attorneys. The developer of an expert
system designed to assist hospitals conducting billing might desire
to achieve compatibility with the computer systems hospitals
exploit most often. 99 Since expert systems, by definition, are
designed to simulate decision making in a specific domain, the
inference engine of any expert system must be capable of operating
in conjunction with the software and hardware environments end
users in that domain customarily employ. Accordingly, courts
should treat elements of the inference engine designed for
compatibility with these standard software and hardware
technologies as nonprotectable ideas.
399. Many expert systems already on the market are designed for use in specific hardware or
software environments. For instance, Megaknowledge Inc. developed -Kappa"- an expert system
designed to assist engineers and other scientists - for use solely with the MS/DOS operating system
and with Microsoft's Windows. See Egol, supra note 323, at 160. Likewise, Dresser Industries, Inc.
recently created an expert system to assist industrial manufacturers select among Ashcroft pressure
gauges. This system operates solely in conjunction with IBM or IBM-compatible hardware. See
Stoddard, Expert System Guides Gauge Selection, IN USnuTm TECHNOLOGY, Dec. 1990, at 42-44.
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VI. CONCLUSION
As computer technologies evolve and become increasingly
complex, jurists worldwide toil to provide sensible legal protection.
Because the computer industry is international, jurists concentrate
on eliminating differences in national laws which might curtail or
abolish incentives for the development, production, and trade of
computer technologies. Comparison of French droit d'auteur and
American copyright law pertaining to computer programs
demonstrates that, at least in some cases, these differences can be
reconciled.
Scholars customarily distinguish the dual set of moral and
pecuniary interests protected under droit d'auteur from the single
set of economic interests protected by copyright. Moreover,
scholars generally differentiate between France's author-centered
concept of originality, requiring works to bear the "impress of the
author's personality," and the United States more pragmatic, more
permissive independent-effort standard. While these doctrinal
differences are real, they may also be shallow. American jurists
have begun to implement laws expanding protection of authors'
moral rights, while French jurists have eliminated most of these
rights for developers of computer programs. Further, the courts'
analyses of originality in both countries now evidence significant
similarity, especially where works of information are the subject
matter in question. In both France and the United States, courts
first examine whether the legal requirement of originality has been
satisfied, that is, whether the author in question worked
independently, without copying. Second, the courts explore the
issue of originality, inquiring whether the work incorporates
sufficient authorial imagination to merit the law's protection.
Where computer programs are the work in question, the courts
investigate whether developers have made creative programming
decisions and, in some cases, whether external constraints have
interfered with those decisions.
End-user requirements, requirements of the target hardware and
software, and conventions of computer programming are among the
principal constraints which narrow the range of expression
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available to computer engineers. As a practical matter, these
constraints frequently render necessary the use of certain standard
elements in both algorithmic programs and works adopting
heuristic programming solutions. Whether developing conventional
programs or expert systems, computer engineers require complete
access to these technologies, the building blocks of their creations.
In the lexicon of both droit d'auteur and copyright, these basic
technologies constitute "ideas" which the law relegates to the
public domain. Although both French and American courts appear
to recognize the importance of preserving these program elements
to the public, they do notyet systematically address the constraints
which make such access imperative.
Ideally, courts should thoroughly and conscientiously analyze
the range of programming expression not only in France and the
United States, but in all countries which apply copyright provisions
to computer programs. As jurists worldwide develop a refmed
understanding of computer technology and, in particular, of the
programming science, they will become better arbiters of which
program elements merit legal protection and which should remain
available for free use in the industry. If they apply uniform
guidelines which address the limitations inherent in developing
computer programs, jurists will strike an appropriate balance
between providing incentives to private production and fostering
broad transnational exchanges of information and technology.

